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The	  Capital	  Commons	  
	  




Executive	  Summary	  	  	  
	  
To	  build	  our	  Republic	  back	  better	  we	  must	  build	  our	  banks	  better.	  The	  overwhelmingly	  
greater	  part	  of	  our	  investment	  capital	  is	  now	  publicly	  generated	  yet	  privately	  managed.	  But	  
pervasive	  and	  still	  underappreciated	  recursive	  collective	  action	  predicaments	  endemic	  to	  all	  
exchange	  economies,	  combined	  with	  the	  decoupling	  of	  profits	  from	  production	  made	  possible	  
by	  stratified	  capital	  ‘markets’	  in	  such	  economies,	  render	  this	  unsustainable.	  	  
	  
The	  only	  way	  to	  get	  public	  capital	  allocation	  right,	  and	  thus	  to	  get	  credit	  modulation	  
and	  long-­‐term	  productive	  investment	  right,	  is	  to	  manage	  public	  capital	  publicly	  and	  private	  
capital	  privately.	  This	  paper	  shows	  how	  to	  do	  that	  through	  the	  simple	  organizing	  framework	  of	  
a	  public	  balance	  sheet	  conceived	  as	  a	  central	  bank	  balance	  sheet.	  	  
	  
Restoring	  our	  Regional	  Federal	  Reserve	  Banks	  to	  their	  original	  status	  as	  a	  network	  of	  
regional	  development	  banks	  –	  ‘Spreading	  the	  Fed’	  –	  will	  ensure	  that	  all	  assets	  financed	  with	  
public	  capital	  are	  productive	  assets.	  This	  it	  will	  do	  both	  by	  discounting	  production-­‐associated	  
business	  paper,	  as	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  by	  strictly	  conditioning	  Fed	  lending	  to	  private	  sector	  banks	  	  
upon	  promised	  local	  and	  regional	  production.	  	  
	  
The	  liability	  side	  counterpart	  to	  this	  asset	  side	  supplementation	  of	  the	  Fed	  balance	  
sheet	  will	  be	  the	  provision	  to	  all	  citizens,	  businesses,	  and	  legal	  residents	  of	  digital	  P2P	  Citizen	  
and	  Business	  wallets	  through	  which	  an	  upgraded	  ‘People’s	  Fed’	  issues	  ‘Democratic	  Digital	  
Dollars.’	  This	  will	  end	  commercial	  and	  financial	  exclusion,	  leaky	  monetary	  policy,	  and	  consumer	  
financial	  data	  ‘harvesting,’	  while	  enabling	  the	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  public	  wealth	  growth	  
through	  ‘Commonwealth	  Growth	  Dividends.’	  	  
	  
A	  macroprudential	  Price	  Stabilization	  Fund	  –	  or	  ‘People’s	  Portfolio’	  –	  and	  FSOC-­‐
inspired	  National	  Reconstruction	  &	  Development	  Council,	  comprising	  the	  heads	  of	  all	  cabinet-­‐
level	  executive	  agencies	  with	  jurisdiction	  over	  infrastructure	  and	  industry,	  completes	  the	  
picture,	  enabling	  perpetual	  democratic	  determination	  of	  what	  nationally	  ‘counts’	  as	  
‘development’	  and,	  therefore,	  ‘productive.’	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Introduction	  –	  Building	  Back	  Better	  by	  Building	  Banks	  Better	  
	  
	   The	  greater	  part	  of	  our	  nation’s	  monetized	  investment	  capital	  is	  publicly	  
generated	  and	  at	  least	  aspirationally	  modulated,	  but	  privately	  allocated.	  (More	  on	  
these	  terms	  in	  a	  moment.)	  It	  is	  privately	  allocated,	  moreover,	  no	  longer	  for	  purposes	  
of	  production,	  but	  for	  profit,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  root	  source	  of	  near	  all	  of	  our	  economy’s,	  and	  hence	  both	  our	  
society’s	  and	  our	  polity’s,	  multiple	  dysfunctions	  of	  recent	  decades.	  It	  is	  our	  financial	  
Original	  Sin,	  as	  it	  were:	  the	  abandonment	  to	  private	  management	  of	  our	  public	  
capital,	  or	  what	  I	  call	  our	  Capital	  Commons.	  	  
	  
Like	  any	  commons,	  the	  Capital	  Commons	  can	  be	  despoiled	  if	  not	  commonly	  
managed	  –	  jointly,	  not	  merely	  severally,	  managed.	  But	  because	  the	  commonly	  
owned	  resource	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  finite	  and	  preaccumulated	  like	  land	  or	  private	  
wealth	  but	  instead	  indefinitely	  extensible	  and	  generated	  as	  monetized	  public	  credit,	  
spoliation	  in	  this	  case	  takes	  different	  form.	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It	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  combined	  underproduction	  and	  overspeculation,	  which	  it	  
will	  barely	  be	  punning	  in	  this	  case	  to	  call	  two	  sides	  of	  one	  coin	  –	  each	  being	  ‘the	  
flipside’	  of	  the	  other.	  	  
	  
The	  moment	  we	  monetize	  public	  capital	  and	  then	  turn	  it	  over	  to	  private	  
management,	  we	  doom	  ourselves	  to	  this	  form	  of	  ‘tragedy	  of	  the	  commons.’	  We	  
effectively	  embrace,	  knowingly	  or	  not,	  perpetual	  misallocation,	  impossible	  




Because	  collective	  action	  predicaments	  –	  I	  don’t	  say	  mere	  ‘problems’	  –	  	  
endemic	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  decentralized	  market	  exchange,	  which	  intensify	  recursively	  
and	  self-­‐amplify	  without	  limit	  once	  capital	  goes	  monetary,	  ensure	  this.	  And	  they	  do	  
so	  in	  ways	  that	  you	  needn’t	  be	  economically	  ‘radical’	  or	  ‘heterodox’	  to	  understand.	  	  
	  
The	  only	  way	  to	  clip	  back	  this	  one	  choking	  vine,	  which	  ramifies	  throughout	  
the	  entirety	  of	  our	  society’s	  systems	  of	  production	  and	  finance,	  is	  to	  restore	  public	  
capital	  to	  public	  management,	  while	  leaving	  private	  capital	  to	  private	  management.	  	  
	  
You	  must	  allow	  only	  privately	  owned,	  pre-­‐accumulated	  capital	  to	  be	  
privately	  allocated,	  while	  ensuring	  that	  indefinitely	  generable	  public	  capital	  is	  
publicly	  allocated.	  And	  you	  must	  allocate,	  ever	  after,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  production,	  
development,	  and	  perpetual	  renewal.	  
	  
‘Building	  Back	  Better,’	  a	  ‘Green	  New	  Deal,’	  …	  any	  program	  of	  what	  I	  call	  
National	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  –	  we	  might	  even	  say	  ‘Building	  Back	  Better	  
&	  Beyond’	  –	  starts	  there.	  It	  starts	  with	  recognition	  that	  ‘building	  back	  better’	  means	  
building	  banks	  better,	  and	  that	  building	  banks	  better	  means	  building	  our	  central	  
bank	  better.	  
	  
So,	  then,	  shall	  I.	  First	  ‘public	  capital,’	  then	  ‘private	  management’	  and	  its	  
impossibility.	  Then	  ‘public	  management’	  and	  what	  ‘minimally	  invasive’	  
reconstructive	  central	  bank	  surgery	  that	  is	  not	  merely	  cosmetic	  will	  look	  like	  …	  
	  
1.	  	  Capital	  –	  Productive	  and	  Otherwise	  
	  
	  First	  things	  first	  –	  capital.1	  Here	  I	  mean	  any	  non-­‐human	  accessory	  to	  
production.	  Machines,	  tools	  and	  factories	  of	  course	  come	  to	  mind,	  for	  in	  the	  first	  
instance	  capital	  is	  like	  this.	  In	  non-­‐barter	  exchange	  economies	  like	  ours,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Because	  this	  document	  is	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  Précis,	  I	  will	  not	  cite	  or	  footnote	  heavily.	  
Instead	  I	  confine	  myself	  in	  the	  main	  to	  noting	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  Section	  the	  prior	  work	  that	  the	  
Section	  draws	  upon	  or	  abbreviates.	  The	  present	  Section	  abbreviates	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  Capital	  
Commons:	  An	  Excavation	  and	  New	  Architecture	  (White	  Paper	  2020).	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capital	  also	  takes	  monetary	  form.	  It	  is,	  effectively,	  just	  purchasing	  power	  deployed	  
in	  the	  purchase	  of	  inputs	  to	  productive	  processes.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  common	  to	  call	  capital	  of	  this	  kind	  ‘investment	  capital,’	  which	  we	  
distinguish	  from	  ‘speculative	  capital’	  –	  a	  variant	  species	  made	  possible	  by	  
monetization	  itself,	  more	  on	  which	  momentarily.	  	  
	  
The	  divergence	  between	  investment	  and	  speculative	  capital	  made	  possible	  
by	  monetization	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  our	  present	  dysfunctions,	  but	  is	  easily	  the	  
worst	  accelerant.	  For	  it	  enables	  the	  recursive	  widening	  without	  limit	  of	  a	  gulf	  
between	  profiting	  and	  producing	  implicit	  in	  any	  decentralization	  of	  production	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  disaggregated	  market	  exchange.	  	  
	  
That	  is	  a	  widening	  that	  dooms	  any	  decentralized	  market	  exchange	  economy	  
like	  ours	  to	  misallocation,	  underproduction,	  and	  over-­‐financialization	  for	  as	  long	  as	  
it	  decentralizes	  not	  only	  production,	  but	  also	  the	  financing	  of	  production.	  	  
	  
Successful	  private	  ordering	  of	  production	  requires	  public	  ordering	  of	  the	  
financing	  of	  production	  –	  at	  least	  where	  public	  capital	  is	  doing	  the	  financing.	  
	  
2.	  Capital	  –	  Public	  and	  Private	  
	  
So	  what	  is	  this	  ‘public’	  capital?2	  In	  what	  sense	  is	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  
investment	  capital	  now	  public?	  The	  answer	  resides	  in	  that	  ‘monetization’	  I	  
mentioned	  before.	  	  
	  
Were	  banking	  and	  finance	  merely	  ‘intermediation,’	  as	  bankers	  want	  you	  to	  
think,	  all	  capital	  would	  be	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  private,	  and	  unproblematic.	  For	  there	  
would	  be	  inherent	  limits.	  All	  that	  was	  lent	  would	  have	  to	  have	  been	  preaccumulated	  
–	  deposits	  would	  ‘make’	  loans.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  how	  banks	  work	  –	  it	  is	  how	  mutual	  
funds	  work.	  Where	  banks	  are	  concerned,	  it	  is	  truer	  to	  say	  ‘loans	  make	  deposits.’	  	  
	  
The	  key	  point	  you	  must	  bear	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  we,	  the	  public,	  supply	  most	  of	  
the	  nation’s	  investment	  capital	  by	  monetizing	  our	  public	  ‘full	  faith	  and	  credit.’	  This	  
takes	  a	  wee	  bit	  of	  detailed	  tracing	  to	  substantiate,	  both	  because	  it	  is	  counterintuitive	  
at	  first	  –	  you’ve	  been	  trained	  through	  such	  words	  as	  ‘intermediation’	  to	  think	  
differently	  –	  and	  because	  the	  process	  of	  monetization	  occurs	  in	  ‘black	  boxes’	  that	  we	  
call	  ‘banks.’	  
	  
You’ve	  heard	  the	  phrase,	  ‘the	  alchemy	  of	  banking’?	  You’re	  about	  now	  to	  learn	  
that	  alchemy.	  This	  is	  how	  we	  turn	  trust	  –	  public	  trust	  –	  into	  gold.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  ROBERT	  HOCKETT,	  THE	  CAPITAL	  COMMONS:	  DIGITAL	  MONEY	  AND	  PUBLIC	  
FINANCE	  IN	  A	  PRODUCTIVE	  COMMERCIAL	  REPUBLIC	  (Manuscript	  2018);	  Hockett,	  An	  Architecture,	  op.	  cit.;	  
and	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Finance	  without	  Financiers,	  48	  POLITICS	  &	  SOCIETY	  3	  (2019),	  available	  at	  
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329219882190?journalCode=pasa.	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Just	  watch	  …	  	  
	  
You	  go	  to	  a	  bank	  for	  a	  loan	  to	  finance	  a	  remunerative	  project	  –	  a	  project	  
you’re	  sure	  will	  be	  profitable.	  You	  need	  purchasing	  power	  to	  purchase	  your	  
project’s	  inputs,	  but	  all	  that	  you	  have	  is	  your	  own	  private	  promissory	  note.	  	  
	  
Your	  note	  is	  not	  legal	  tender	  –	  it’s	  not	  recognized	  money	  –	  hence	  can’t	  serve	  
directly	  as	  monetized	  investment	  capital.	  So	  you	  go	  to	  the	  bank	  to	  exchange	  it	  –	  to	  
swap	  it	  –	  temporarily	  for	  public	  promissory	  notes.	  These	  do	  count	  as	  legal	  tender,	  as	  
money,	  and	  hence	  purchasing	  power	  usable	  to	  finance	  production.	  	  
	  
Look	  at	  a	  dollar,	  read	  across	  the	  top.	  A	  dollar	  is	  a	  Federal	  Reserve	  Note	  –	  a	  
‘note’	  as	  your	  promissory	  note	  is	  a	  note.	  But	  it	  is	  more	  widely	  usable.	  That’s	  why	  it’s	  
money	  –	  public	  money.	  	  
	  
The	  bank	  is	  going	  to	  evaluate	  your	  proposed	  project	  before	  approving	  your	  
proposed	  swap.	  I	  want	  to	  talk	  about	  how	  it	  does	  that	  in	  a	  moment,	  for	  much	  hinges	  
on	  that.	  But	  first	  let	  us	  see	  how	  the	  swap	  works	  and	  how	  it	  turns	  privately	  approved	  
loans	  into	  publicly	  issued	  capital…	  	  
	  
If	  the	  bank	  approves	  your	  swap	  application,	  it	  is	  going	  to	  trade	  for	  your	  
promissory	  note	  not	  quite	  literal	  public	  promissory	  notes,	  but	  what	  used	  to	  be	  
called	  their	  fiduciary	  equivalent.	  It	  is	  going	  to	  open	  an	  account	  in	  your	  name,	  credit	  
an	  account	  already	  there	  in	  your	  name,	  or	  provide	  you	  a	  check	  –	  another	  variant	  on	  
our	  old	  friend	  the	  promissory	  note	  –	  that	  instructs	  someone	  else	  to	  credit	  you.	  	  
	  
Now	  for	  the	  kicker:	  you	  can	  immediately	  spend	  this	  credit	  –	  it	  is	  monetary	  
from	  the	  get-­‐go,	  requiring	  no	  antecedent	  accumulation	  of	  gold	  in	  a	  sack,	  bills	  in	  a	  
vault,	  or	  whatever.	  You	  simply	  insert	  a	  chip,	  swipe	  a	  strip,	  or	  key	  a	  blip	  and	  you’ve	  
paid	  for	  the	  inputs	  to	  your	  bank-­‐financed	  project,	  be	  they	  machine	  tools	  or	  a	  ticket	  
to	  Vegas	  (we’ll	  come	  back	  to	  that).	  
	  
What	  makes	  this	  possible	  –	  what	  makes	  it	  a	  private	  note	  /	  public	  note	  swap	  –	  
is	  that	  the	  bank	  is	  a	  publicly	  licensed	  institution	  networked	  into	  our	  national	  
payments	  system.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  that	  system	  sits	  …	  wait	  for	  it	  …	  our	  central	  bank.	  
In	  the	  US,	  that	  is	  the	  Fed,	  a	  public	  instrumentality	  that	  oversees	  banks	  chartered	  by	  
yet	  other	  public	  instrumentalities	  –	  the	  suggestively	  named	  ‘Comptroller	  of	  the	  
Currency’	  for	  national	  banks,	  and	  state	  banking	  commissioners	  for	  state	  banks.	  
	  
A	  functioning	  money	  is	  just	  ‘that	  which	  pays’	  in	  a	  payments	  system	  –	  ‘that	  
which	  counts’	  in	  a	  system	  of	  debit	  and	  credit	  and	  value	  accounting.	  And	  it	  is	  we,	  the	  
public,	  who	  legislate	  what	  shall	  pay,	  what	  shall	  count,	  and	  who	  shall	  disseminate	  it	  
when	  we	  generate	  it,	  ex	  nihilo,	  through	  public-­‐private	  note	  swapping.	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And	  here	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  again,	  we	  have	  legislated	  that	  the	  public	  sector	  Fed	  shall	  
generate	  and	  hence	  modulate	  it,	  while	  private	  sector	  banks	  shall	  allocate	  it.	  	  
	  
I	  am	  not	  a	  licensed	  bank,	  so	  I	  can	  only	  purport	  to	  lend	  to	  you	  by	  ‘opening	  an	  
account’	  in	  your	  name	  and	  handing	  you	  a	  chip	  card	  or	  strip	  card	  to	  ‘swipe	  the	  swap.’	  
But	  when	  you	  swipe	  it	  to	  purchase	  your	  inputs	  –	  machine	  tools	  or	  plane	  tickets	  or	  
otherwise	  –	  nothing	  will	  happen.	  	  
	  
It	  ‘doesn’t	  count.’	  It	  will	  not	  pay.	  It	  is	  not	  money,	  it’s	  not	  a	  public	  capital	  
instrument	  swapped	  for	  your	  private	  capital	  instrument.	  Nor	  is	  it	  that	  instrument’s	  
instantly	  generable	  and	  indefinitely	  extensible	  fiduciary	  equivalent	  –	  a	  ‘bank	  
account.’	  For	  again,	  I’m	  not	  a	  bank.	  
	  
This	  form	  of	  monetized	  public	  investment	  capital	  changes	  everything,	  and	  
has	  done	  for	  centuries.	  Its	  analysis	  lay	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  greatest	  
economist	  you’ve	  never	  heard	  of,	  Sweden’s	  Knut	  Wicksell	  (1851-­‐1928),	  who	  called	  
this	  stuff	  ‘bank	  money.’3	  	  	  
	  
You’ve	  heard	  of	  Keynes,	  and	  ‘the	  Austrians,’	  though.	  Fragments	  –	  and	  alas,	  
only	  fragments	  –	  of	  Wicksell’s	  insights	  found	  their	  way	  into	  contemporary	  thinking	  
through	  Keynes	  in	  the	  Anglosphere	  and	  ‘the	  Austrians’	  beyond.	  But	  Wicksell’s	  
followers	  drew	  only	  modulatory,	  not	  allocative,	  lessons	  from	  his	  work.	  	  
	  
And	  that	  is	  our	  tragedy,	  as	  we’re	  nearly	  ready	  now	  to	  see.	  
	  
Keynes	  and	  the	  Austrians	  ‘got’	  the	  endogenous	  money	  and	  consequent	  
bipolar	  ‘swinging’	  to	  which	  Wicksell	  attended	  with	  ceaseless	  attention	  to	  detail.	  	  
That’s	  all	  that	  Keynes’s	  ‘credit	  money’	  spin	  on	  Wicksell’s	  ‘bank	  money,’	  and	  
Austrians’	  ‘business	  cycle’	  spin	  on	  his	  ‘cumulative	  process’	  effectively	  were.	  	  
	  
That	  is	  why	  ‘neo-­‐,’	  ‘post-­‐,’	  ‘classical-­‐,’	  and	  others	  whom	  I	  call	  ‘x,	  y,	  z-­‐
Keynesians’	  of	  all	  stripes	  fixate	  on	  the	  ‘macro-­‐economics’	  that	  they	  credit	  Keynes	  
with	  inventing.	  And	  it’s	  why	  Austrians	  fixate	  on	  ‘taming’	  endogenous	  money	  by	  
shackling	  it	  to	  finite-­‐supplied	  shiny	  metals	  or	  ‘rules.’	  	  
	  
None	  of	  these	  bromides	  helps	  much,	  however,	  as	  surely	  the	  past	  eighty	  years	  
should	  have	  demonstrated.	  And	  this	  is	  because	  you	  cannot	  get	  the	  macro	  right	  
without	  getting	  the	  micro	  right.	  You	  cannot	  well	  modulate	  until	  you	  well	  allocate.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	   See	  KNUT	  WICKSELL,	  GELDZINS	  UND	  GÜTERPREISE	  (1898).	  
4	  	   The	  distinction	  between	  and	  relations	  among	  what	  the	  present	  author	  calls	  ‘credit-­‐
modulatory’	  policy	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  ‘credit-­‐allocative’	  policy	  on	  the	  other	  are	  fundamental	  to	  the	  
author’s	  work	  of	  the	  past	  12	  years,	  and	  failure	  to	  attend	  carefully	  to	  their	  relations	  accounts	  for	  a	  
surprisingly	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  financial	  and	  macroeconomic	  disasters	  of	  the	  past	  
century.	  For	  essential	  background,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Robert	  Hockett,	  A	  Fixer-­‐Upper	  for	  Finance,	  87	  WASHINGTON	  
UNIVERSITY	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1213	  (2009),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367278	  (introducing	  the	  distinction	  and	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What	  then	  to	  do?	  	  
	  
The	  key	  is	  to	  reattach	  macro	  to	  micro	  –	  that	  is,	  modulation	  to	  allocation.	  	  For	  
while	  those	  are	  analytically	  distinct,	  as	  both	  I	  and	  others	  have	  argued	  for	  years	  now,	  
they	  are	  practically	  inseparable.	  	  
	  
And	  to	  see	  how	  to	  do	  this	  –	  how	  to	  reunite	  modulation	  and	  allocation	  –	  we’ll	  
do	  best	  to	  return	  to	  your	  swap	  for	  a	  moment…	  
	  
3.	  	  Capital	  &	  Production	  –	  Their	  Divorce,	  Our	  Broken	  Home	  
	  
In	  evaluating	  your	  swap	  application,	  the	  bank	  asks	  itself	  whether	  you’re	  apt	  
to	  succeed	  with	  your	  project.	  That	  is	  a	  micro-­‐,	  not	  macro	  question.	  And	  the	  bank	  will	  
unpack	  and	  address	  this	  question	  by	  reference	  not	  to	  production,	  but	  to	  profit.5	  	  
	  
That	  is	  the	  rational	  thing	  for	  the	  bank	  to	  do	  in	  a	  system	  where	  not	  only	  
production,	  but	  also	  production	  finance,	  is	  left	  to	  market	  exchange.	  The	  bank	  
survives	  and	  keeps	  its	  shareholders	  happy	  in	  our	  fragmented	  system	  only	  as	  it	  
profits.	  	  
	  
And	  our	  system	  of	  bank	  regulation	  –	  in	  the	  terms	  used	  above,	  our	  bank	  
licensing	  regime	  –	  publicly	  endorses	  this.	  It	  polices	  primarily	  bank	  ‘safety	  and	  
soundness’	  –	  that’s	  a	  regulatory	  term	  of	  art	  –	  and	  aims	  above	  all	  else	  to	  …	  another	  
term	  of	  art	  …	  ‘prevent	  bank	  failure.’	  	  	  
	  
None	  of	  this	  would	  be	  problematic	  were	  profits	  and	  producing	  identical	  or	  
even	  proximately	  linked,	  such	  that	  production	  would	  ‘take	  care	  of	  itself’	  just	  so	  long	  
as	  we	  ensured	  profitability.	  But	  alas,	  the	  monetization	  of	  investment	  capital	  as	  noted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proposing	  ‘regulation	  as	  modulation’	  as	  preferred	  model	  of	  financial	  supervision);	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
The	  Macroprudential	  Turn:	  From	  Institutional	  ‘Safety	  and	  Soundness’	  to	  Systemic	  ‘Financial	  Stability’	  in	  
Financial	  Supervision,	  9.	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  VIRGINIA	  LAW	  &	  BUSINESS	  REVIEW	  1	  (2015),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206189	  (interpreting	  the	  move	  toward	  
macroprudential	  finance	  oversight	  as	  reflecting	  long-­‐awaited	  implicit	  recognition	  of	  the	  distinction’s	  
regulatory	  importance);	  and	  other	  sources	  cited	  infra.	  	  
For	  discussion	  of	  the	  practical	  inseparability	  of	  the	  conceptually	  distinct	  allocation	  and	  
modulation	  functions,	  and	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  inseparability	  for	  the	  sustainability	  of	  our	  
present	  practice	  of	  assigning	  allocation	  to	  Treasury	  and	  modulation	  to	  the	  Fed,	  see	  HOCKETT,	  THE	  
CAPITAL	  COMMONS:	  DIGITAL	  MONEY	  AND	  CITIZEN	  CENTRAL	  BANKING	  IN	  A	  COMMERCIAL	  REPUBLIC	  (Manuscript	  
2018).	  And	  for	  a	  popularly	  accessible	  discussion	  of	  the	  conceptual	  distinction	  and	  the	  practical	  
difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  it,	  see	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘Money	  in	  Context,	  Part	  1,’	  Law	  &	  Political	  Economy,	  
April	  8,	  2020,	  available	  at	  https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-­‐in-­‐context-­‐part-­‐1/;	  and	  Robert	  
Hockett,	  ‘Money	  in	  Context,	  Part	  2,’	  Law	  &	  Political	  Economy,	  April	  9,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-­‐in-­‐context-­‐part-­‐2/.	  	  
5	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  the	  sources	  cited	  above	  in	  note	  2,	  as	  well	  as	  upon	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
The	  Dialectic	  of	  Finance	  (Manuscript	  2017);	  and	  ROBERT	  HOCKETT,	  ROUSSEAUVIAN	  MONEY	  (Manuscript	  
2018),	  available	  at	  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278408.	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above	  enables	  a	  divergence,	  while	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  public	  capital	  management	  to	  
profit-­‐driven	  private	  sector	  financiers	  guarantees	  that	  divergence.	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  it	  guarantees	  not	  only	  that	  this	  divergence	  can	  and	  will	  happen,	  but	  
also	  that	  it	  will	  steadily	  widen	  through	  time,	  ‘feed	  on	  itself’	  without	  limit	  till	  terminal	  
collapse.	  	  
	  
That	  sounds	  apocalyptic	  –	  it	  should,	  for	  it	  is	  –	  and	  this	  might	  have	  led	  you	  to	  
think	  I’ll	  now	  posit	  some	  ‘radical,’	  exotic,	  or	  ‘heterodox’	  idea	  in	  explaining	  myself.	  
Something	  about	  ‘dialectic,’	  ‘deconstruction,’	  ‘Minsky	  Moment’	  or	  some	  such	  thing	  …	  	  	  
	  
But	  I’m	  not.	  	  
	  
The	  crowning	  irony	  of	  our	  present	  god-­‐awful	  mess	  is	  that	  the	  dysfunction	  
endemic	  to	  decentralized	  private	  management	  of	  centrally	  supplied	  public	  capital	  is	  
entirely	  accessible	  to	  orthodox	  intuition.	  	  
	  
It	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  attributable	  to	  variants	  on	  orthodox	  ‘market	  failure’	  
more	  familiar	  in	  both	  ‘freshwater’	  and	  ‘saltwater’	  precincts	  even	  than	  in	  hotbeds	  of	  
heresy	  like	  late	  19th	  century	  Paris	  or	  London,	  or	  late	  20th	  century	  Annandale-­‐on-­‐
Hudson	  or	  Tennessee.	  	  
	  
I	  am	  referring	  to	  collective	  action	  predicaments	  that	  loom	  around	  any	  setting	  
in	  which	  people	  decide	  things	  individually	  that	  can	  affect	  all	  collectively.	  The	  
garden-­‐variety	  renditions	  of	  these	  challenges	  are	  familiar,	  while	  what	  I	  have	  long	  
called	  their	  iterative,	  recursive	  renditions	  for	  some	  reason	  are	  not.	  
	  
4.	  	  Collective	  Action	  Predicaments	  –	  Recursive	  and	  Otherwise	  
	  
A	  collective	  action	  predicament	  –	  call	  it	  a	  ‘CAP’	  –	  is	  a	  choice	  situation	  in	  which	  	  
individually	  rational	  decisions	  aggregate	  into	  collectively	  irrational	  outcomes.6	  
Think	  of	  the	  rush	  to	  the	  theatre	  door	  after	  ‘fire!’	  is	  shouted,	  or	  of	  everyone’s	  
standing	  at	  once	  to	  ‘get	  a	  better	  view.’	  	  
	  
A	  CAP	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  a	  ‘tragic	  situation’	  –	  tragic	  in	  the	  classical	  Greek	  –	  
‘damned	  if	  you	  do,	  damned	  if	  you	  don’t’	  –	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  trivial,	  ‘bad	  news’	  sense.	  
(I	  harp	  on	  this	  because	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  situation	  is	  what	  is	  critical,	  and	  only	  
‘predicament’	  and	  the	  Greek	  sense	  of	  ‘tragedy,’	  not	  the	  imprecise	  ‘problem’	  or	  
‘disaster,’	  convey	  that.)	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  the	  last	  cited	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  upon	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Recursive	  
Collective	  Action	  Problems:	  The	  Structure	  of	  Procyclicality	  in	  Money	  Markets,	  Macroeconomies,	  and	  
Formally	  Similar	  Contexts,	  3	  JOURNAL	  OF	  FINANCIAL	  PERSPECTIVES	  1	  (2013),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239849.	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CAPs	  are	  familiar	  enough	  generically	  –	  again,	  ‘fire!’	  –	  but	  their	  pervasive	  
affliction	  of	  decentralized	  market	  exchange	  seems	  to	  be	  strangely	  underappreciated.	  
And	  what	  I	  have	  dubbed	  their	  far	  worse	  	  recursive	  renditions	  –	  lets	  call	  them	  
‘ReCAPS’	  –	  seem	  to	  attract	  no	  notice	  at	  all.	  	  
	  
This,	  I	  believe,	  is	  why	  we	  don’t	  solve	  them.	  It’s	  why	  we	  keep	  getting	  finance	  
and,	  accordingly,	  production	  all	  wrong.	  
	  
A	  few	  examples	  to	  sharpen	  understanding	  …	  	  
	  
The	  most	  salient	  non-­‐recursive	  CAPs	  where	  production	  is	  concerned	  stem	  
from	  what	  I	  call	  ‘controllability’	  and	  ‘capturability’	  problems,	  respectively,	  in	  
economies	  in	  which	  production	  is	  delegated	  to	  decentralized	  private	  ordering.	  
Controllability	  problems	  induce	  collectively	  irrational	  underinvestment	  in	  
productive	  industry	  –	  why	  individually	  invest	  in	  a	  firm,	  for	  example,	  if	  
underemployment,	  deflation	  or	  inflation	  in	  the	  macro-­‐environment	  make	  future	  
sales	  uncertain?	  Capturability	  problems	  induce	  collectively	  irrational	  
underinvestment	  in	  infrastructures	  necessary	  to	  production	  –	  why	  individually	  
invest	  if	  the	  ‘positives’	  yielded	  by	  the	  investment	  are	  mainly	  ‘external’?	  	  
	  
Recursive	  CAPs	  –	  again,	  ReCAPs	  –	  are	  collective	  action	  problems	  with	  
‘feedback	  effects.’	  They	  are	  self-­‐worsening	  in	  consequence	  of	  their	  structure,	  which	  
drives	  an	  iterative	  process	  pursuant	  to	  which	  individual	  reactions	  at	  time	  t+1	  to	  
events	  that	  occur	  at	  time	  t	  do	  not	  mute,	  nullify,	  or	  counteract	  those	  events,	  but	  
repeat	  them	  in	  more	  acute	  and	  collectively	  devastating	  form.	  	  
	  
Examples	  abound	  in	  decentralized	  markets,	  especially	  but	  not	  solely	  in	  
banking	  and	  capital	  markets.	  A	  few	  more	  familiar	  examples	  will	  make	  the	  point	  …	  	  
	  
Inflation:	  You	  and	  I	  see	  prices	  rising,	  hence	  rationally	  buy	  more	  now	  rather	  
than	  waiting	  till	  later;	  but	  this	  just	  makes	  prices	  rise	  faster.	  Deflation:	  You	  and	  I	  see	  
prices	  falling,	  hence	  rationally	  defer	  buying	  or	  hiring	  till	  later;	  but	  this	  just	  makes	  
prices	  fall	  further	  and	  unemployment	  rise	  faster.	  Bank	  Run:	  You	  and	  I	  hear	  that	  our	  
bank	  is	  faced	  with	  liquidity	  trouble,	  hence	  rationally	  ‘run’	  there	  to	  withdraw	  our	  
funds;	  but	  this	  simply	  hastens	  the	  eventuality	  we	  fear.	  Asset	  Price	  Bubble:	  Simply	  a	  
hyperinflation	  in	  capital	  markets.	  Market	  Crash	  or	  Asset	  ‘Fire	  Sale’:	  Simply	  a	  debt-­‐




The	  story	  of	  ‘financialization,’	  productive	  atrophy,	  and	  crash-­‐to-­‐crash	  
lurching	  on	  the	  part	  of	  our	  macroeconomy	  over	  the	  past	  50	  years	  just	  is	  the	  story	  of	  
unnoticed	  collective	  action	  predicaments	  endemic	  to	  the	  microstructure	  of	  that	  
economy.	  And	  that	  microstructure	  is	  a	  structure	  of	  scattered	  nodes	  of	  individual	  
agency	  actuated	  by	  individual	  ‘interests.’	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That	  needn’t	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  production.	  But	  it	  will	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  
production	  if	  we	  let	  it	  act	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  production	  finance.	  
	  
It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  decentralize	  production,	  it	  is	  another	  to	  decentralize	  the	  
financing	  of	  production	  –	  at	  least	  when	  we	  do	  so	  with	  public	  as	  well	  as	  private	  
capital.	  The	  first	  simply	  isn’t	  compatible	  with	  the	  second.	  
	  
That’s	  apt	  to	  strike	  you	  as	  counterintuitive	  at	  first	  –	  again,	  we’ve	  been	  taught	  
otherwise,	  and	  have	  been	  taught	  not	  to	  think	  of	  production	  and	  production	  finance	  
separately.	  But	  disaggregate	  and	  then	  think	  of	  them	  separately,	  and	  you	  will	  this	  is	  
right…	  	  
	  
Simply	  remind	  yourself	  that	  if	  finance	  is	  for	  profit,	  and	  profit	  is	  possible	  
without	  production,	  then	  production	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  under-­‐financed,	  while	  
unproductive	  and	  even	  counterproductive	  profiting	  will	  be	  over-­‐financed	  –	  indeed	  
vastly	  over-­‐financed	  once	  indefinitely	  extensible	  public	  capital	  (‘bank	  money’)	  gets	  
into	  the	  act.	  	  
	  
Hence	  my	  earlier	  mention	  of	  Vegas,	  where	  people	  go	  not	  to	  produce,	  but	  to	  
win	  from	  others	  what	  they	  already	  have…	  	  
	  
But	  what	  can	  we	  do	  about	  it?	  
	  
5.	  	  Collective	  Capital	  Agency,	  a.k.a.	  ‘Management’	  –	  What	  the	  Fed’s	  For	  
	  
To	  solve	  a	  collective	  action	  problem,	  you	  have	  to	  exercise	  collective	  agency.7	  
We	  used	  to	  have	  a	  word	  for	  this	  –	  we	  called	  such	  agency	  ‘governance,’	  and	  called	  its	  
agents	  –	  our	  agents	  –	  our	  ‘governments.’8	  	  	  
	  
The	  chief	  secret	  of	  capital,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  ungoverned	  production	  is	  in	  the	  
long-­‐run	  incompatible	  with	  ungoverned	  finance.	  And	  by	  ‘governing’	  I	  don’t	  mean	  
reactive	  regulation.	  I	  mean	  proactive	  allocation	  –	  allocation	  on	  which	  production	  
and,	  in	  the	  end,	  modulation	  itself	  depend.	  	  
	  
And	  this	  takes	  us	  straight	  to	  our	  solution…	  
	  
Here’s	  something	  you	  might	  not	  have	  known.	  The	  Fed	  is	  a	  national	  
development	  bank	  –	  our	  national	  development	  bank.	  Some	  sophisticates	  probably	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  Hockett,	  Digital	  Money	  and	  Public	  Finance,	  op.	  cit.;	  Hockett,	  An	  
Architecture,	  op.	  cit.;	  and	  Hockett,	  Finance	  without	  Financiers,	  op.	  cit..	  
8	  	   The	  ‘Austrians’	  -­‐	  Böhm-­‐Bawerk,	  von	  Mises,	  Hayek,	  Schumpeter	  …	  -­‐	  kind	  of	  ‘got’	  this.	  But	  
unlike	  the	  Swedes	  –	  principally	  Wicksell	  and	  Myrdal	  –	  who	  tipped	  them	  off,	  all	  of	  them	  save	  
Schumpeter	  seem	  to	  have	  had	  Freudian	  ‘issues’	  with	  authority.	  Hence	  they	  overlooked	  this	  solution,	  
which	  is	  the	  only	  solution.	  In	  fine	  Habsburg	  fashion,	  they	  re-­‐fetishized	  metal	  finery	  instead.	  Fisher,	  
more	  on	  whom	  presently,	  ‘got’	  it	  as	  well,	  but	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  thought	  we	  could	  get	  on	  without	  public	  
capital.	  We	  can,	  provided	  we’re	  cool	  with	  subsistence-­‐level	  production.	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understand,	  at	  least	  obliquely,	  that	  the	  Fed	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  public	  capital	  manager	  –	  
that’s	  sort	  of	  what	  credit	  modulation	  and	  monetary	  policy	  are	  all	  about	  once	  public	  
capital	  has	  been	  monetized	  –	  but	  they	  won’t	  get	  the	  development	  bit.	  	  
	  
That	  is	  because	  we	  have	  severed	  capital	  from	  its	  original	  productive	  purpose,	  
as	  noted	  above,	  while	  relatedly	  severing	  modulation	  from	  allocation	  and	  macro	  
from	  micro.	  The	  three	  divorces	  are	  all	  of	  a	  piece.	  They	  are	  faces	  of	  one	  
schizophrenia,	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  in	  which	  finance	  and	  development	  are	  unrelated	  or	  
even	  at	  war.	  	  	  
	  
Now	  if	  you	  want	  to	  find	  words	  like	  ‘finance’	  and	  ‘development’	  joined	  in	  one	  
title	  or	  phrase,	  you	  have	  to	  read	  journals	  like	  ‘Finance	  and	  Development’	  –	  the	  joint	  
publication	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  legally	  known	  as	  the	  International	  Bank	  
for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development.	  You	  won’t	  find	  these	  things	  tied	  together	  in	  
any	  self-­‐styled	  ‘developed’	  society.	  
	  
We	  didn’t	  used	  to	  think	  ‘development’	  something	  only	  for	  ‘underdeveloped	  
countries.’	  Nor,	  accordingly,	  did	  we	  think	  of	  ‘development	  finance’	  as	  a	  special	  kind	  
of	  finance	  only	  for	  underdeveloped	  client	  states.	  All	  finance	  used	  to	  be	  ‘development	  
finance,’	  just	  as	  all	  capital	  was	  productive	  capital.	  	  
	  
That	  was	  back	  when	  we	  understood	  public	  capital	  had	  to	  be	  not	  only	  publicly	  
modulated,	  at	  the	  ‘macro’	  level,	  but	  also	  publicly	  allocated,	  at	  the	  ‘micro’	  level.	  You	  
know	  how	  you	  can	  tell	  that?	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  Fed’s	  ‘federation’	  –	  its	  federated	  
structure	  –	  which	  dates	  back	  to	  its	  establishment	  through	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  
(FRA)	  of	  1913.	  
	  
People	  often	  seem	  confused	  by	  the	  Fed.	  They	  speak	  of	  ‘the	  Federal	  Reserve	  
Bank’	  	  (not	  ‘a	  thing’),	  then	  ‘the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  (‘a	  thing,’	  but	  only	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
bigger	  thing).	  	  When	  you	  then	  tell	  them	  that	  we	  have	  a	  ‘Federal	  Reserve	  System’	  
(that’s	  the	  thing),	  	  they	  wonder	  how	  a	  ‘System’	  can	  regulate	  or	  conduct	  monetary	  
policy	  as	  if	  it	  had	  agency.	  Was	  Alan	  Greenspan	  ‘a	  system’?	  Was	  Janet	  Yellen?	  Is	  Jay	  
Powell?	  	  
	  
Maybe	  best	  not	  to	  answer	  those	  last	  ones	  ...	  
	  
The	  Fed	  is	  a	  ‘system’	  because	  it	  comprises	  multiple	  distinct	  nodes	  of	  agency	  
at	  two	  distinct	  ‘levels’	  –	  one	  corresponding	  to	  what	  I’ve	  called	  ‘macro’	  and	  
‘modulatory,’	  the	  other	  corresponding	  to	  what	  I’ve	  called	  ‘micro’	  and	  ‘allocative.’	  
The	  Fed	  Board	  is	  the	  first	  of	  those,	  while	  the	  Regional	  Federal	  Reserve	  Banks	  –	  I’ll	  
call	  them	  Regional	  Fed	  Banks	  or	  Regional	  Feds	  –	  constitute	  the	  second.	  	  
	  
The	  Regional	  Feds	  were	  meant	  originally	  to	  help	  finance	  ‘development’	  in	  our	  
nation’s	  many	  still	  ‘underdeveloped’	  regions	  circa	  1913,	  which	  they	  did	  by	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monetizing	  –	  ‘discounting’	  –	  productive	  commercial	  paper.9	  That	  is	  a	  credit-­‐
allocative	  function	  –	  it’s	  about	  productively	  directing	  the	  flow	  of	  public	  investment	  
capital	  as	  I	  defined	  it	  above.	  	  
	  
The	  Board	  was	  in	  turn	  meant	  to	  coordinate	  all	  of	  this	  regional	  development	  
financing,	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	  partial	  decentralization	  across	  separate	  regions	  didn’t	  
fall	  prey	  to	  CAPs	  and	  ReCAPS	  as	  defined	  above,	  and	  in	  consequence	  generate	  
nationwide	  modulatory	  dysfunction	  –	  inflation,	  deflation,	  hyper-­‐inflation	  or	  debt-­‐
deflation.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  credit-­‐modulatory	  function	  –	  it’s	  about	  centrally	  orchestrating,	  via	  
control	  of	  the	  national	  credit	  pipeline,	  the	  coherent	  functioning	  of	  regional	  public	  
capital	  disseminators	  to	  avoid	  mis-­‐allocation	  and,	  with	  it,	  mis-­‐modulation.	  	  	  
	  
This	  was	  a	  brilliant	  arrangement	  –	  maybe	  more	  brilliant	  even	  than	  its	  
founders	  fully	  realized.	  In	  a	  single	  organizational	  stroke,	  it	  offered	  institutional	  
means	  of	  solving	  the	  ages-­‐old	  allocation/modulation	  conundrum,	  while	  relatedly	  
defusing	  our	  ages-­‐old	  national	  ambivalence	  over	  the	  dangers	  of	  capital	  
concentration	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  capital	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐generation	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  
	  
That	  conundrum	  and	  associated	  ambivalence	  had	  been	  the	  twin	  drivers	  of	  a	  
strange	  national	  oscillation	  between	  central	  banking	  and	  de	  facto	  monetary	  anarchy	  
from	  the	  era	  of	  Hamilton	  on	  down	  through	  the	  gilded	  age,	  and	  at	  last	  they	  were	  
institutionally	  solved	  –	  in	  potential,	  at	  least.	  	  
	  
The	  institutional	  solution,	  moreover,	  took	  a	  form	  that	  bridged	  not	  only	  macro	  
and	  micro,	  not	  only	  modulation	  and	  allocation,	  but	  also	  public	  and	  private.	  For	  
productive	  initiative	  was	  left	  to	  private	  sector	  producers	  and	  entrepreneurs,	  while	  
decisions	  whether	  publicly	  to	  monetize	  project-­‐associated	  private	  paper	  were	  
assigned	  to	  institutions	  that	  were	  themselves	  hybrid	  entities	  –	  the	  Regional	  Fed	  
Banks	  being,	  as	  they	  were,	  overseen	  by	  Boards	  of	  Directors	  with	  membership	  two-­‐
thirds	  determined	  by	  private	  sector	  entities	  subject	  to	  Fed	  Board	  approval.	  	  
	  
And	  so	  there	  it	  was,	  a	  network	  of	  public-­‐private	  regional	  development	  banks	  
overseen	  by	  a	  nationwide	  public	  capital	  overseer.	  And	  hence	  an	  optimal	  half-­‐
centralization	  of	  public	  development	  finance	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  decentralized	  private	  
productive	  activity.	  	  
	  
So	  what	  happened?	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   Another	  tragically	  forgotten	  bit	  of	  Fed	  –	  and	  hence	  our	  Republic’s	  financial	  –	  history.	  And	  an	  
ironic	  one	  at	  that,	  given	  the	  near-­‐obsession	  with	  discounting	  commercial	  paper	  as	  the	  right	  way	  to	  
central-­‐bank	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Paul	  Warburg,	  the	  most	  influential	  Fed	  founder.	  See	  the	  brilliant	  PAUL	  M.	  
WARBURG,	  THE	  DISCOUNT	  SYSTEM	  IN	  EUROPE	  (1910),	  and	  try	  not	  to	  weep.	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It	  grows	  a	  bit	  complicated	  here,	  as	  I’ve	  written	  at	  greater	  length	  elsewhere.	  
Suffice	  it	  for	  present	  purposes	  to	  say	  that	  a	  national	  mobilization	  for	  world	  war	  only	  
four	  years	  after	  the	  FRA’s	  passage	  (From	  Warburg	  to	  War,	  one	  might	  say),	  followed	  
by	  a	  global	  pandemic	  …	  hmm	  …	  and	  then	  a	  ‘roaring’	  decade	  in	  which	  ‘America’s	  
business	  was	  business’	  and	  politicians’	  business	  was	  to	  ‘get	  out	  of	  the	  way,’	  led	  to	  
our	  largely	  forgetting	  the	  Fed’s	  modulatory	  and	  allocative	  purposes	  and	  consequent	  
potential	  as	  public	  capital	  manager	  for	  private	  production.	  	  
	  
Sure,	  we	  rediscovered	  the	  modulatory	  task	  and	  even	  dimly	  discerned	  its	  
relation	  to	  the	  allocative	  task	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  after	  the	  Roaring	  20s	  
clammed	  up	  with	  a	  bang.	  That	  is	  what	  founding	  the	  mixed	  Board/Regional	  Federal	  
Open	  Market	  Committee	  (FOMC)	  as	  permanent	  link	  between	  modulatory	  Board	  and	  
allocative	  Regional	  Fed	  Banks	  amounted	  to.	  	  
	  
But	  we’ve	  never	  grown	  clear,	  as	  a	  polity,	  about	  what	  this	  stuff’s	  for	  or	  is	  all	  
about.	  And	  so	  we	  now	  live	  with	  the	  upshot	  of	  inattention	  –	  inattention	  to	  what	  we	  
actually	  have,	  right	  now,	  right	  here	  before	  us,	  thanks	  to	  our	  insightful	  and	  
foresightful	  ancestors.	  	  
	  
That	  upshot?	  Continual	  misallocation	  of	  public	  capital	  by	  privately	  profit-­‐,	  
not	  production-­‐,	  driven	  ‘financial’	  institutions;	  consequent	  capital	  mis-­‐modulation	  
by	  timid	  or	  ill-­‐informed	  stewards	  of	  our	  capital	  commons;	  and	  thus	  perpetual	  
under-­‐production,	  over-­‐speculation,	  and	  ‘secular	  stagnation.’10	  
	  
Let’s	  fix	  this.	  
	  
6.	  	  Publicly	  Managed	  Public	  Capital,	  Privately	  Managed	  Private	  Capital	  
	  
	   As	  I’ve	  suggested,	  we	  already	  have	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  institutions	  we	  need	  
now	  to	  do	  what	  needs	  doing.	  Their	  enabling	  acts	  need	  not	  even	  be	  amended,	  but	  
must	  simply	  read	  in	  accord	  with	  their	  origins.	  These	  are	  the	  legacies,	  indeed	  the	  
bequests,	  of	  our	  forebears	  –	  Paul	  Warburg	  foremost	  among	  them.	  What’s	  needed	  is	  
re-­‐appreciation	  of	  these	  institutions’	  institutional	  purposes	  –	  and	  associated	  re-­‐
appropriation	  of	  their	  originally	  mandated	  mandates.	  	  	  
	  
What	  that	  means	  practically	  is	  that	  we	  must	  reconfigure	  a	  few	  things	  to	  take	  
public	  capital	  management	  back	  under	  public	  management,	  while	  fittingly	  leaving	  
private	  capital	  to	  private	  management.	  We’ve	  already	  begun	  doing	  this,	  as	  it	  
happens	  –	  first	  with	  QE	  mortgage	  paper	  during	  the	  last	  crisis,	  and	  now	  with	  pretty	  
much	  every	  kind	  of	  paper	  under	  the	  sun	  (including	  decidedly	  non-­‐solar	  fossil	  fuels!)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Robert	  Hockett	  &	  Richard	  Vague,	  Debt,	  Deflation,	  and	  Debacle:	  Of	  Private	  Debt	  Write-­‐
Down	  and	  Public	  Recovery,	  White	  Paper,	  Global	  Interdependence	  Center,	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  
Philadelphia	  (2013),	  available	  at	  https://www.interdependence.org/wp-­‐
content/uploads/2013/04/Debt-­‐Deflation-­‐and-­‐Debacle-­‐RV-­‐and-­‐RH1.pdf.	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during	  the	  present	  pandemic.11	  Isn’t	  it	  time	  that	  we	  grew	  more	  deliberate	  –	  and	  
transparent	  –	  about	  all	  of	  this	  allocation?	  
	  
Note,	  even	  if	  only	  in	  passing,	  how	  politically	  attractive	  this	  will	  be	  if	  we’re	  
finally	  clear	  in	  pronouncements	  about	  what	  we	  are	  doing…	  	  
	  
Want	  to	  ‘End	  the	  Fed,’	  Representative	  Paul,	  where	  the	  management	  of	  
private	  capital	  is	  concerned?	  You’re	  right	  –	  leave	  that	  entirely	  to	  ‘unfettered’	  private	  
capital	  managers,	  so	  long	  as	  they’re	  not	  money-­‐laundering,	  financing	  drug-­‐lords	  or	  
terrorists,	  etc.	  Want	  to	  ‘kill	  crony	  capitalism,’	  fellow	  Wall	  Street	  Occupier?	  You	  too	  
are	  right	  –	  stop	  channeling	  public	  capital	  through	  profit-­‐,	  not	  production-­‐moved	  
private	  ‘financiers.’	  	  
	  
	   But	  how?	  It’s	  easier	  than	  you	  might	  think.	  We	  can	  organize	  thought	  and	  
planning	  here	  in	  the	  way	  all	  intelligent	  investors	  and	  entrepreneurs	  do	  –	  by	  
recourse	  to	  a	  balance	  sheet.	  ‘Assets	  on	  the	  left,	  liabilities	  on	  the	  right.’	  Here	  is	  what	  
proper	  accounting	  and	  accountability	  –	  that	  is,	  proper	  management	  –	  of	  our	  public	  
capital	  stock	  will	  look	  like.	  	  	  
	  
7.	  	  Public	  Assets	  –	  ‘Spread	  the	  Fed’	  
	  
	   Let’s	  start	  with	  assets,	  since	  everyone	  wants	  those.12	  An	  asset	  is	  generated	  
each	  time	  a	  loan	  is	  extended.	  Bank	  loans	  are	  assets	  on	  bank	  portfolios.	  As	  noted	  
above,	  private	  sector	  bank	  loans	  effectively	  tie	  asset	  value	  to	  project	  profitability,	  
which	  as	  also	  noted	  above	  is	  a	  very	  good	  idea	  if	  profitability	  perforce	  means	  
productivity.	  But	  monetized	  capital	  and	  practically	  unrestricted	  betting	  opportunity	  
on	  secondary,	  what	  I	  call	  n-­‐ary,	  and	  derivative	  ‘capital	  markets’	  divorces	  the	  two,	  
underwriting	  our	  constant	  misallocations	  and	  consequent	  mis-­‐modulations.	  
	  
	   (Side	  bar:	  Why	  the	  scare	  quotes	  round	  ‘capital	  markets’?	  Easy:	  There	  should	  
be	  markets	  only	  in	  the	  fruits	  of	  productive	  activity,	  not	  in	  the	  agents	  of	  productive	  
activity	  –	  labor	  and	  public	  capital.	  The	  reasons	  for	  saying	  this	  of	  capital	  are	  what	  you	  
have	  been	  reading.	  The	  reasons	  for	  saying	  it	  about	  labor	  you’ll	  find	  in	  a	  companion	  
piece	  to	  this	  one	  –	  what	  I	  call	  A	  Republic	  of	  Owners.)	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   See,	  e.g.,	  the	  excellent	  summary	  compiled	  by	  my	  former	  colleagues	  at	  FRBNY:	  Gara	  Afonso	  et.	  
al,	  ‘A	  New	  Reserves	  Regime?	  Covid	  19	  and	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Balance	  Sheet,’	  Liberty	  Street	  
Economics,	  July	  7,	  2020,	  available	  at	  https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/07/a-­‐
new-­‐reserves-­‐regime-­‐covid-­‐19-­‐and-­‐the-­‐federal-­‐reserve-­‐balance-­‐sheet.html.	  
12	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Spread	  the	  Fed:	  Distributed	  Central	  Banking	  in	  
Pandemic	  and	  Beyond,14	  VIRGINIA	  LAW	  &	  BUSINESS	  REVIEW	  __	  (2020)	  (forthcoming),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597724.	  Also	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘Spreading	  the	  
Fed:	  From	  Federal	  Disintegration	  through	  Community	  QE	  to	  Central	  Bank	  Decentralization,	  Part	  2,’	  
Law	  &	  Political	  Economy,	  August	  11,	  2020,	  available	  at	  https://lpeproject.org/blog/spread-­‐the-­‐fed-­‐
part-­‐i/;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘Spreading	  the	  Fed:	  From	  Federal	  Disintegration	  through	  Community	  QE	  to	  
Central	  Bank	  Decentralization,	  Part	  2,’	  Law	  &	  Political	  Economy,	  August	  12,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://lpeproject.org/blog/spread-­‐the-­‐fed-­‐part-­‐ii/.	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   To	  solve	  the	  problem,	  just	  pull	  a	  ‘Parent	  Trap’	  –	  remarry	  production	  and	  
profit.	  Do	  that	  by	  fine-­‐tuning	  what	  we	  do	  now:	  Require	  private	  sector	  lenders	  and	  
other	  financiers	  to	  finance	  projects	  in	  either	  of	  two	  ways,	  each	  keyed	  to	  the	  source	  
of	  the	  capital	  to	  be	  invested…	  	  
	  
For	  privately	  originated,	  pre-­‐accumulated	  capital,	  let	  private	  sector	  lenders	  
and	  financiers	  invest	  unrestrictedly	  –	  at	  least	  as	  consistent	  with	  the	  criminal	  law.	  
For	  publicly	  generated,	  Fed-­‐monetized	  credit-­‐capital,	  require	  pre-­‐approval	  of	  
projects	  by	  regional	  Fed	  Banks.	  Instruct	  these	  institutions,	  in	  turn,	  to	  evaluate	  
projects	  by	  reference	  not	  simply	  to	  profits,	  but	  to	  production.	  	  
	  
	   You	  might	  at	  first	  wonder	  whether	  Regional	  Fed	  Banks	  are	  up	  to	  this	  task.	  
The	  answer	  is	  that	  they	  are,	  and	  the	  question	  is	  not	  even	  a	  close.	  To	  see	  why,	  ask	  
yourself	  first	  what	  they	  do	  now…	  	  
	  
Have	  you	  ever	  noticed	  that	  what	  Regional	  Feds	  do	  now	  is	  essentially,	  in	  the	  
words	  of	  one	  of	  my	  brilliant	  Research	  Assistants,	  simply	  to	  ‘write	  papers	  and	  stuff’?	  	  
	  
She’s	  right.	  Ms.	  Yuan	  is	  correct.	  That’s	  what	  I	  did	  when	  I	  worked	  there.	  But	  
it’s	  the	  ‘and	  stuff’	  part	  that’s	  most	  interesting	  where	  fine-­‐tuning’s	  concerned.	  Fed	  
Banks	  have	  Research	  Departments,	  and	  what	  they	  research	  are	  economic	  trends	  
and	  developments	  within	  their	  regions	  –	  just	  as	  assigned	  to	  them	  way	  back	  in	  1913.	  
All	  they	  do	  not	  do	  now	  that	  was	  assigned	  them	  back	  then	  is	  to	  monetize	  project	  
paper	  –	  that	  is,	  purposefully	  lend	  public	  capital.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   This	  is	  what	  I	  am	  saying	  that	  they	  should	  do.	  They	  should	  monetize	  private	  
paper	  again,	  be	  it	  directly,	  or	  via	  private	  sector	  banks,	  or	  via	  Band	  of	  North	  Dakota	  
style	  public	  banks,	  or	  all	  of	  the	  above.	  They	  know	  how	  to	  do	  it.	  Their	  Research	  
Departments	  are	  practically	  telling	  them	  how	  to	  do	  it.	  (Banks	  use	  their	  research	  
now,	  but	  banks	  can’t	  solve	  CAPs	  or	  ReCAPS.)	  We’re	  just	  not	  letting	  them	  do	  it.	  Let’s	  
let	  them	  do	  it	  –	  no,	  let’s	  make	  them	  do	  it.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  present	  is	  an	  especially	  opportune	  time	  to	  make	  this	  transition	  –	  to	  
‘cross	  (back)	  over’	  to	  our	  original	  way	  of	  doing	  things.	  There	  is	  even	  a	  beautiful	  sort	  
of	  symmetry	  in	  what	  I	  shall	  propose	  –	  a	  symmetry	  beyond	  that	  of	  mutually	  
offsetting	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  on	  our	  public	  ‘balance	  sheet.’	  For	  a	  war	  and	  pandemic	  
one	  century	  ago	  first	  took	  our	  Regional	  Feds	  off	  their	  mission,	  and	  the	  wars	  and	  
pandemic	  of	  the	  present	  now	  offer	  the	  chance	  to	  restore	  them	  to	  that	  mission.	  	  
	  
I	  allude	  to	  my	  ‘Spread	  the	  Fed’	  proposal…	  
	  
You’ve	  likely	  heard	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  new	  Municipal	  Liquidity	  and	  Main	  Street	  
Lending	  Facilities.13	  These	  are	  about	  aiding	  our	  states,	  municipalities,	  and	  small	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   The	  author	  has	  been	  assisting	  state	  and	  municipal	  officials	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  new	  Fed	  facilities.	  
See,	  e.g.,	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  Fed’s	  Municipal	  Liquidity	  Facility:	  Present	  and	  Future	  Possibilities	  and	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businesses	  nationwide	  in	  riding	  out	  and	  reversing	  the	  devastation	  of	  the	  present	  
pandemic	  –	  a	  pandemic	  our	  principal	  collective	  agent,	  the	  nation’s	  Chief	  Executive	  –	  
doesn’t	  seem	  able	  to	  handle.	  (One	  who	  lacks	  agency	  –	  ‘self-­‐control’	  –	  lacks	  the	  
makings	  of	  collective	  agency.)	  These	  programs	  are	  brilliant	  in	  conception	  and	  
almost	  immeasurably	  promising	  in	  potential,	  working	  as	  they	  do	  to	  take	  assets	  
associated	  with	  public	  goods	  and	  in	  need	  of	  public	  support	  onto	  the	  public	  balance	  
sheet.	  But	  they	  are	  absurd	  in	  their	  present	  administration.	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  is	  straightforward.	  The	  MLF	  is	  administered	  entirely	  out	  of	  the	  
Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  in	  Lower	  Manhattan.	  The	  MSLF	  for	  their	  part	  are	  
administered	  out	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Boston	  in	  …	  yes,	  Boston.	  I	  have	  
worked	  at	  the	  first	  and	  with	  the	  second.	  Their	  staffs	  are	  brilliant	  and	  earnest,	  
creative	  yet	  sober.	  But	  they	  are	  tiny	  in	  number,	  and	  to	  ask	  them	  to	  sort	  out	  the	  
needs	  Oahu	  and	  Billings,	  or	  of	  Tony’s	  Tractor	  Repair	  in	  Dorado	  or	  Nancy’s	  Nails	  in	  
Watts	  is	  to	  do	  them	  and	  their	  beneficiaries	  –	  to	  do	  us	  –	  an	  intolerable	  injustice.	  	  	  
	  
What	  should	  we	  be	  doing?	  Easy:	  Spread	  the	  Fed.	  Let	  Dallas	  handle	  Tulsa	  and	  
Cleveland	  handle	  Ashtabula.	  Let	  Kansas	  City	  look	  after	  the	  financing	  needs	  of	  Packer	  
Plastics	  in	  Lawrence	  and	  Atlanta	  those	  of	  Mimi’s	  in	  the	  Marigny.	  Better	  yet,	  
incorporate	  additional	  Regional	  Feds	  now	  that	  the	  western	  half	  of	  the	  country	  is	  
filled-­‐in	  as	  it	  wasn’t	  in	  1913.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  ridiculous	  that	  Missouri	  has	  two	  Fed	  while	  California	  –	  no,	  while	  the	  
entire	  West	  plus	  Hawaii	  –	  has	  one.	  But	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  ‘redistribute’	  the	  Fed	  
Banks,	  it	  means	  to	  make	  more.	  ‘Re-­‐Distribute’	  –	  restore	  to	  national	  distributed	  
status	  –	  to	  make	  it	  the	  locally	  responsive	  national	  development	  bank	  it	  was	  always	  
intended	  to	  be.	  Do	  that,	  and	  the	  Fed’s	  role	  in	  publicly	  managing	  and	  investing	  our	  
capital	  will	  look	  as	  depicted	  Figure	  1,	  in	  which	  Regional	  Fed	  Banks	  lend,	  solely	  for	  
projects	  reasonably	  likely	  to	  prove	  productive,	  to	  issuers.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Necessities,	  Memorandum,	  May	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597732;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Community	  QE2:	  
New	  Key	  Provisions	  and	  an	  Updated	  ‘Game	  Plan’	  for	  State	  and	  Municipal	  Action,	  Memorandum,	  May	  
2020,	  available	  at	  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589851;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
Community	  QE:	  Key	  Provisions	  and	  a	  ‘Game	  Plan’	  for	  Immediate	  State	  Action,	  Memorandum,	  April	  
2020,	  available	  at	  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3574157.	  Also	  Robert	  
Hockett,	  ‘Community	  QE:	  An	  April	  Game	  Plan	  for	  States	  and	  Cities,’	  Forbes,	  April	  12,	  2020,	  available	  
at	  https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/04/12/community-­‐qean-­‐april-­‐game-­‐plan-­‐for-­‐
states-­‐and-­‐cities/#138495c03624;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘Optimize	  Community	  QE:	  An	  Open	  Letter	  to	  Fed	  
Chairman	  Powell,’	  Forbes,	  June	  14,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/06/14/optimize-­‐community-­‐qean-­‐open-­‐letter-­‐to-­‐
fed-­‐chairman-­‐powell/;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘Community	  QE	  –	  Illinois	  Signs	  On,	  and	  Eligibility	  Further	  
Expands,	  But	  “Penalty	  Rates”	  Still	  Have	  to	  Go,’	  Forbes,	  June	  5,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/06/05/community-­‐qe-­‐-­‐illinois-­‐signs-­‐on-­‐and-­‐
eligibility-­‐further-­‐expands-­‐but-­‐penalty-­‐rates-­‐still-­‐gotta-­‐go/#5b593cfb18f2;	  and	  Robert	  Hockett,	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Figure	  1:	  Reformed	  Bank/	  ‘Spread	  Fed’	  /	  Producer	  Relations	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  




Some	  of	  this	  lending	  will	  be	  direct,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  Fed	  discounting	  of	  
privately	  issued	  paper	  issued	  for	  production,	  and	  some	  of	  it	  will	  be	  indirect,	  flowing	  
through	  private	  sector	  banks	  and	  public	  banks	  accessing	  the	  Fed’s	  Discount	  Window	  
just	  as	  Paul	  Warburg	  envisaged	  well	  over	  a	  century	  ago.	  All	  that	  changes	  relative	  to	  
current	  practice	  is	  that	  the	  Regional	  Fed	  Banks	  now	  (1)	  take	  the	  lead	  role	  in	  lending,	  
(2)	  resume	  early	  20th	  century	  direct	  lending	  to	  producers,	  and	  (3)	  condition	  all	  
lending	  on	  ex	  ante	  showings	  of	  reasonably	  likely	  production.	  	  
	  
Lending	  of	  genuinely	  private	  capital,	  for	  its	  part,	  need	  not	  change	  at	  all.	  (Self-­‐
styled	  ‘conservatives’	  should	  love	  this.)	  Banks	  may	  make	  loans	  for	  productive	  or	  
merely	  speculative	  projects,	  provided	  they	  fund	  the	  loans	  fully	  with	  deposits,	  in	  
effect	  making	  themselves	  what	  they	  routinely	  now	  falsely	  label	  themselves	  –	  
‘intermediaries.’	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  is	  straightforward	  in	  light	  of	  the	  discussion	  above:	  unproductive	  
lending	  is	  only	  a	  problem	  when	  publicly	  generated	  and	  indefinitely	  extensible	  public	  
capital,	  not	  privately	  accumulated	  scarce	  private	  capital,	  is	  what	  is	  lent.	  This	  is	  the	  
kernel	  of	  wisdom	  in	  Irving	  Fisher’s	  ‘100%	  Money’	  proposals	  of	  the	  early-­‐mid	  1930s,	  
which	  came	  a	  cropper	  only	  because	  they	  were	  all	  about	  ‘shalt	  not’s,	  not	  ‘shalt’s,	  
where	  public	  capital	  is	  concerned.	  Ditto	  the	  many	  retreads	  of	  Fisher	  at	  present	  on	  
offer.14	  What	  these	  all	  lack	  is	  a	  ‘shalt’	  in	  respect	  of	  public	  capital	  –	  the	  ‘shalt’	  of	  
productive	  investment.	  And	  that	  is	  precisely	  what	  I	  am	  prescribing.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  	   See	  IRVING	  FISHER,	  100%	  MONEY	  (1935).	  Keynes	  politely	  declined	  to	  endorse	  the	  plan	  upon	  
receiving	  Fisher’s	  invitation	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  the	  plan	  included	  no	  public-­‐issuance	  to	  offset	  the	  private	  
contraction	  that	  Fisher’s	  narrow	  banking	  proposal	  would	  bring	  –	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  debt-­‐deflation	  no	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‘Production,’	  of	  course	  –	  indeed	  by	  design	  –	  is	  doing	  a	  good	  bit	  of	  work	  here.	  
I’ll	  accordingly	  return	  to	  both	  it	  and	  ‘development’	  momentarily.	  But	  let	  us	  complete	  
our	  first	  pass	  at	  the	  national	  balance	  sheet	  first.	  Let’s	  look	  at	  liabilities…	  	  
	  
8.	  	  Public	  Liabilities	  –	  Digitize	  the	  Dollar,	  Widen	  the	  Wallets	  
	  
Corresponding	  to	  the	  asset	  portfolio	  on	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  of	  any	  balance	  
sheet	  are	  the	  asset-­‐holder’s	  liabilities	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  same.15	  As	  
discussed	  at	  some	  length	  above,	  our	  Fed	  already	  issues	  the	  principal	  tradable	  public	  
liability	  that	  all	  of	  us	  now	  use	  in	  purchasing,	  paying,	  speculating,	  and	  investing.	  That	  
is	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Note	  noted	  above	  –	  the	  Dollar.	  	  
	  
The	  Fed	  also	  maintains	  a	  system	  of	  Reserve	  Accounts	  for	  our	  banks,	  thereby	  
operating	  as	  a	  ‘bank	  to	  the	  banks’	  –	  hence	  our	  term	  ‘central	  bank’	  –	  and	  using	  these	  
accounts	  both	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  monetary	  policy	  (partly	  through	  Interest	  on	  Reserves,	  or	  
IOR)	  and	  as	  a	  liquidity	  management	  device	  (partly	  through	  Reserve	  Requirements).	  
This	  is	  the	  fiduciary	  rendition	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  Notes	  –	  in	  Wicksell’s	  terms,	  the	  Fed	  ‘bank	  
money’	  alongside	  its	  ‘paper	  money.’16	  	  	  
	  
In	  effect,	  then,	  the	  Fed	  already	  stands	  between	  banks	  and	  the	  non-­‐bank	  
entities	  whose	  issuances	  it	  presently	  holds	  in	  its	  asset	  portfolio	  –	  principally	  
Treasury	  Securities,	  Agency	  Securities,	  and	  IMF	  Special	  Drawing	  Rights	  (SDRs)	  
during	  ‘normal’	  times,	  supplemented	  by	  mortgage-­‐related	  and	  now	  additional	  
private	  sector	  issuances	  during	  recession	  and,	  at	  this	  point,	  pandemic.	  What	  I	  have	  
done	  above	  is	  simply	  to	  add	  productive	  private	  sector	  loans	  to	  the	  portfolio,	  which	  
invites	  us	  to	  ask	  what	  the	  liability	  side	  counterpart	  addition	  should	  be	  …	  	  	  
	  
The	  counterpart	  to	  adding	  productive	  private	  sector	  loans	  to	  the	  asset	  side	  of	  
the	  public	  balance	  sheet	  just	  is	  to	  add	  interest-­‐bearing	  private	  sector	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  
(P2P)	  digital	  wallets	  to	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  public	  balance	  sheet.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  Democratic	  Digital	  Dollar:	  A	  Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer-­‐
Savings	  &	  Payments	  Platform	  for	  Fully	  Inclusive	  State,	  Local,	  and	  National	  Money	  &	  Banking	  Systems,	  
10	  HARVARD	  BUSINESS	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1	  (2020),	  available	  at	  https://www.hblr.org/wp-­‐
content/uploads/sites/18/2020/02/The-­‐Democratic-­‐Digital-­‐Dollar_HBLR_FINAL.pdf;	  and	  ROBERT	  
HOCKETT,	  FINANCING	  THE	  GREEN	  NEW	  DEAL:	  A	  PLAN	  OF	  ACTION	  AND	  RENEWAL	  (Palgrave	  2020).	  Also	  Robert	  
Hockett,	  Money’s	  Past	  is	  Fintech’s	  Future:	  Wildcat	  Crypto,	  the	  Digital	  Dollar,	  and	  Citizen	  Central	  
Banking,	  2	  STANFORD	  JOURNAL	  OF	  BLOCKCHAIN	  LAW	  AND	  POLICY	  1	  (2019),	  available	  at	  https://stanford-­‐
jblp.pubpub.org/pub/wildcat-­‐crypto-­‐fintech-­‐future/release/1;	  Hockett,	  An	  Architecture,	  op.	  cit.;	  and	  
Hockett,	  Finance	  without	  Financiers,	  op.	  cit..	  
16	  	   WICKSELL,	  op.	  cit.	  There	  is	  a	  unfortunate	  tendency	  among	  some	  contemporary	  economists,	  
not	  to	  mention	  legal	  and	  finance	  scholars,	  to	  interpret	  ‘loanable	  funds’	  as	  a	  preaccumulated	  quantum	  
exogenously	  supplied	  by	  bank	  depositors.	  Wicksellian	  loanable	  funds	  without	  endogenous	  bank	  
money	  generation	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  decaffeinated	  coffee	  –	  the	  very	  point	  of	  the	  thing’s	  been	  discarded.	  One	  
contemporary	  economist	  who	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  this	  error	  is	  Woodford.	  See,	  e.g.,	  MICHAEL	  WOODFORD,	  
INTEREST	  AND	  PRICES	  (Princeton	  U.	  Press	  2003),	  the	  title	  of	  which	  fittingly	  channels	  Wicksell.	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This	  is	  how	  the	  Fed	  can	  and	  must	  round	  out	  and	  complete	  its	  ongoing	  
pandemic-­‐prompted	  balance	  sheet	  expansion	  as	  it	  (1)	  transitions,	  as	  it	  already	  now	  
aims	  to	  do,	  to	  issuance	  of	  a	  digital	  dollar,	  and	  (2)	  upgrades,	  as	  it	  is	  already	  now	  
doing,	  the	  national	  payments	  platform	  to	  permit	  real	  time	  clearing	  and	  settling	  of	  
transactions	  (I	  refer	  to	  ‘FedNow’).	  All	  it	  need	  do	  is	  add	  digital	  citizen	  banking	  and	  
business	  banking	  to	  its	  current	  ‘bank	  banking.’	  	  
	  
Here’s	  how	  it	  will	  work.	  First,	  every	  citizen,	  business,	  and	  legal	  resident	  
receives	  an	  interest-­‐bearing	  digital	  wallet	  –	  call	  it	  a	  Democratic	  Digital	  Dollar	  (3D)	  
Wallet	  –	  accessible	  by	  desktop,	  laptop,	  smartphone	  or	  other	  device.	  Second,	  each	  
such	  wallet	  is	  endowed	  with	  (1)	  what	  I	  call	  ‘vertical’	  connectivity	  to	  a	  ‘master	  
account’	  on	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet,	  and	  (2)	  what	  I	  call	  ‘horizontal’	  
(again,	  P2P)	  connectivity	  to	  all	  other	  wallets.	  	  
	  
I	  call	  the	  resultant	  digital	  payments	  platform	  the	  ‘Democratic	  Digital	  Dollar,’	  
or	  ‘3D,’	  platform	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  for	  which	  I’ve	  proposed	  both	  Fed	  and	  
Treasury	  (‘Digital	  Greenback’	  and	  ‘Treasury	  Dollar’)	  renditions.17	  I	  call	  it	  the	  
‘Inclusive	  Value	  Ledger’	  (IVL)	  platform	  at	  the	  state	  and	  local	  levels,18	  with	  one	  
version	  now	  before	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Legislature	  and	  another	  before	  the	  city	  of	  
Kansas	  City.19	  
	  
On	  any	  rendition,	  wallet	  holders	  are	  enabled	  to	  pay	  taxes,	  licensing	  fees,	  and	  
other	  remittances,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  receive	  tax	  refunds,	  program	  moneys,	  and	  other	  
disbursements,	  along	  the	  platform’s	  vertical	  dimension.	  Then	  they	  can	  also	  make	  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  	   See	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Digital	  Greenbacks:	  A	  Sequenced	  ‘TreasuryDirect’	  and	  ‘FedWallet’	  Plan	  for	  
the	  Democratic	  Digital	  Dollar,	  16	  JOURNAL	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  LAW	  &	  POLICY	  __	  (2020)	  (forthcoming),	  
available	  at	  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3599419.	  Also	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
The	  Treasury	  Dollar	  Act	  of	  2020	  (Draft	  Bill),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563007.	  
18	   See	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  Empire	  State	  Inclusive	  Value	  Ledger	  72	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  LAW	  REVIEW	  __	  
(2020)	  (forthcoming)),	  available	  at	  https://ronkimnewyork.com/downloads/The-­‐New-­‐York-­‐
Inclusive-­‐Value-­‐Ledger-­‐Sept-­‐2019.pdf.;	  and	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470923.	  
19	  	   See	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  Empire	  State	  Inclusive	  Value	  Ledger	  Establishment	  and	  
Administration	  Act	  of	  2019,	  available	  at	  
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08686&term=2019&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&
Text=Y&Committee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y.	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Private	  sector	  payments	  over	  the	  platform	  will	  occur	  on	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  
the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet,	  just	  as	  accounts	  and	  payments	  now	  respectively	  subsist	  and	  
occur	  on	  the	  liability	  sides	  of	  combined	  private	  sector	  bank	  balance	  sheets	  which	  
themselves	  are	  in	  effect	  on	  the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet	  at	  one	  remove,	  via	  the	  banks’	  own	  
Reserve	  Accounts	  at	  the	  Fed.	  In	  effect,	  this	  will	  give	  perfect	  account-­‐book	  reflection	  
to	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  trading	  with	  one	  another	  ‘severally’	  in	  our	  private	  capacities,	  we	  
are	  all	  trading	  liabilities	  that	  we	  ‘jointly’	  issue	  –	  Fed	  promissory	  notes	  –	  in	  our	  public	  
capacity	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  really	  that	  simple.	  And	  this	  should	  not	  be	  surprising.	  For,	  think	  about	  it:	  
presently	  private	  sector	  banks	  hold	  privately	  extended	  loans	  on	  the	  asset	  sides	  of	  
their	  balance	  sheets,	  and	  corresponding	  privately	  owned	  demand	  deposits	  on	  the	  
liability	  sides	  of	  their	  balance	  sheets.	  All	  we	  are	  doing	  is	  removing	  those	  portions	  of	  
both	  of	  these	  that	  involve	  public	  capital	  to	  the	  public	  balance	  sheet,	  leaving	  all	  that	  
involves	  only	  private	  capital	  as	  is.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Before	  ‘tying	  all	  together’	  by	  merging	  this	  liability	  side	  tweak	  with	  the	  asset	  
side	  supplementation	  described	  above,	  it	  is	  worth	  quickly	  enumerating	  a	  few	  of	  the	  
many	  advantages	  that	  the	  liability	  side	  supplementation	  will	  entail…	  
	  
Inclusion:	  In	  a	  commercial	  society	  or	  exchange	  economy	  like	  ours,	  a	  payment	  
system	  amounts	  to	  an	  essential	  public	  utility	  –	  a	  functionality	  that	  justice	  requires	  
Fed Platform Administrator	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we	  make	  freely	  available	  to	  all.	  We	  will	  now	  have	  that.	  No	  more	  ‘unbanked’	  or	  
‘under-­‐banked.’	  Call	  this	  the	  justice,	  inclusion,	  or	  public	  utility	  rationale	  for	  adding	  a	  
universal	  3D	  platform	  to	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  public	  balance	  sheet.	  	  
	  
Growth:	  Meanwhile,	  we	  measure	  the	  size	  and	  growth	  of	  our	  economy	  by	  
reference	  to	  transaction	  volume,	  such	  that	  more	  efficient	  payments	  mean	  greater	  
growth,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  and	  a	  larger	  economy	  over	  time.	  So,	  of	  course,	  does	  greater	  
inclusion	  itself.	  Call	  this	  the	  growth	  or	  efficiency	  reason	  for	  adding	  a	  universal	  3D	  
platform	  to	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  public	  balance	  sheet.	  Justice	  and	  efficiency	  thus	  
converge	  to	  commend	  it.	  
	  
Monetary	  Policy	  Efficacy:	  A	  3D	  platform	  on	  the	  Fed’s	  balance	  sheet	  will	  also	  
enable	  much	  faster	  fiscal	  stimulus	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  monetary	  policy	  transmission	  
than	  does	  our	  present	  system	  of	  private	  sector	  banking	  institutions,	  which	  we	  can	  
only	  hope	  will	  transmit	  federal	  stimulus	  money	  to	  consumers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cheap	  
credit.	  In	  extremis,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  drop	  digital	  ‘helicopter	  money’	  directly	  into	  our	  
digital	  3D	  Wallets.	  In	  less	  volatile	  times	  –	  times	  that	  the	  reconstruction	  I’m	  
prescribing	  will	  make	  far	  more	  common,	  indeed	  ‘the	  new	  normal’	  –	  we	  can	  
countercyclically	  modulate	  spending	  activity	  by	  raising	  3D	  Wallet	  rates	  when	  we	  
must	  slow	  down	  and	  lowering	  them	  when	  we	  must	  speed	  up	  spending	  activity.	  	  
	  
Value:	  A	  digitized	  public	  payments	  platform	  on	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  public	  
balance	  sheet	  also	  will	  enable	  public	  agencies	  from	  federal	  on	  down	  to	  local,	  should	  
we	  wish,	  to	  dispense	  monetary	  rewards	  to	  ‘care	  work’	  providers	  and	  other	  
contributors	  to	  the	  public	  good	  that	  our	  present	  payment	  arrangements	  render	  too	  
difficult	  for	  most	  governments	  to	  deem	  feasible.	  A	  teen	  who	  helps	  grade-­‐schoolers	  
with	  homework	  after	  school,	  or	  a	  friend	  or	  family	  member	  who	  cares	  for	  a	  ‘shut-­‐in,’	  
can	  transmit	  digital	  ‘proof	  of	  work’	  (POW)	  to	  a	  city,	  state,	  or	  federal	  social	  services	  
authority	  and	  receive	  spendable	  3D	  credits	  in	  return.	  There	  will	  be	  no	  need	  for	  
‘complementary	  currencies’	  –	  the	  newly	  digitized	  3D	  will	  itself	  be	  that	  currency.	  	  
	  
Privacy:	  Going	  digital	  will	  offer	  commercial	  and	  financial	  data	  privacy	  
benefits	  too.	  Public	  administrators	  of	  Fed	  liabilities	  don’t	  act	  for	  profit	  –	  there	  are	  no	  
‘carrots’	  to	  entice	  ‘data	  harvest.’	  They	  also	  are	  subject	  to	  both	  4th	  Amendment	  
constraints	  and	  criminal	  sanctions,	  unlike	  Wells	  Fargo	  or	  Facebook	  –	  there	  is	  a	  
‘stick.’	  	  
	  
No	  matter	  how	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  matter,	  then,	  it	  seems	  clear	  we	  should	  
institute	  a	  universal	  3D	  Platform	  on	  the	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet	  as	  the	  
Fed	  digitizes	  the	  dollar	  and	  upgrades	  the	  national	  payments	  platform.	  Merge	  this	  
with	  the	  public	  productive	  lending	  to	  be	  represented	  on	  the	  asset	  side	  of	  the	  Fed	  
balance	  sheet,	  and	  you	  have	  in	  effect	  all	  the	  rudiments	  of	  a	  full	  Public	  Capital	  
Manager	  to	  manage	  our	  public	  capital	  –	  all	  while	  leaving	  bona	  fide	  private	  capital	  to	  
private	  capital	  management.	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I	  promised	  before	  to	  return	  to	  ‘productive,’	  which	  is	  what	  must	  distinguish	  
public	  capital	  management	  from	  private	  capital	  management.	  Let	  us	  now	  complete	  
our	  portrayal	  of	  renewed	  and	  regenerative	  public	  capital	  management	  by	  looking	  a	  
bit	  more	  ‘deeply’	  at	  what	  production	  both	  does	  and	  must	  mean.	  And	  let’s	  link	  it	  up	  
with	  the	  now	  clearly	  necessary	  project	  of	  national	  reconstruction	  –	  what	  I’m	  calling	  
‘Building	  Back	  Better	  &	  Beyond.’	  
	  
9.	  	  National	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  –	  An	  FSOC	  for	  ‘R&D’	  
	  
Have	  you	  noticed	  how	  the	  names	  of	  certain	  periods	  in	  our	  history,	  and	  of	  the	  
institutions	  that	  we	  have	  established	  to	  manage	  significant	  challenges	  in	  those	  
periods,	  tend	  to	  feature	  words	  like	  ‘reconstruction’	  and	  ‘development’?20	  And	  have	  
you	  noticed	  how	  they	  also	  tend	  to	  run	  these	  together	  as	  if	  they	  were	  one-­‐off,	  post-­‐
crisis	  affairs?	  	  
	  
Such	  was	  the	  post-­‐	  Civil	  War	  Reconstruction.	  Such	  was	  the	  Reconstruction	  
Finance	  Corporation	  (RFC)	  that	  financed	  first	  our	  New	  Deal	  and	  then	  our	  Second	  
World	  War	  mobilization.	  And	  such	  is	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development	  (IBRD,	  aka	  ‘World	  Bank’)	  that	  we	  established	  to	  rebuild	  the	  world	  
after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  	  
	  
Associating	  reconstruction	  and	  development	  is	  a	  good	  idea.	  Thinking	  of	  them	  
as	  brief,	  one-­‐off	  post-­‐crisis	  affairs	  is	  not.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  a	  tragic	  mistake.	  	  
	  
It	  is,	  in	  effect,	  of	  a	  piece	  with,	  if	  not	  identical	  to,	  the	  mistake	  that	  has	  been	  our	  
(1)	  long-­‐term	  forgetting	  that	  capital	  is	  for	  production,	  not	  speculation,	  and	  thus	  (2)	  
consigning	  our	  public	  capital	  to	  private	  management	  while	  (3)	  severing	  macro	  from	  
micro	  and	  (4)	  modulation	  from	  allocation.	  	  
	  
We	  should	  accordingly	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  ‘lever’	  present	  appreciation	  of	  
ongoing	  crisis	  necessitating	  a	  national	  ‘reconstruction.’	  But	  we	  should	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  also	  make	  permanent	  those	  things	  that	  we	  do	  now	  reconstruct…	  	  
	  
For	  scientific	  and	  technological	  development	  are	  perpetual,	  and	  so	  then	  must	  
national	  development	  be.	  We	  speak	  of	  ‘research	  and	  development’	  in	  the	  one	  case,	  
and	  often	  abbreviate	  it	  as	  ‘R&D.’	  Let’s	  use	  the	  same	  conjunction	  henceforth	  for	  
‘reconstruction	  and	  development’	  too,	  since	  the	  latter	  is	  always	  the	  fruit	  of	  the	  
former.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  HOCKETT,	  FINANCING	  THE	  GREEN	  NEW	  DEAL,	  op.	  cit.;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
Productive	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnering	  in	  Crisis	  and	  Beyond,	  63	  CHALLENGE	  __	  (2020),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3697293	  
;	  and	  Robert	  Hockett,	  An	  FSOC	  for	  Continuous	  Public	  Investment:	  The	  National	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development	  Council,	  10	  MICHIGAN	  BUSINESS	  AND	  ENTREPRENEURIAL	  LAW	  REVIEW	  __	  (2020),	  available	  at	  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3697282.	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Henceforth,	  then,	  ‘R&D’	  will	  mean	  reconstruction	  and	  development	  too.	  And	  
‘development’	  thus	  defined	  will	  in	  turn	  define	  …	  here	  comes	  the	  kicker	  …	  
‘productive’	  as	  well.	  Here	  is	  the	  key	  to	  ‘productive’	  as	  we	  move	  to	  make	  public	  




In	  other	  work,	  I	  have	  proposed	  establishment	  of	  new	  twinned	  national	  
development	  institutions	  patterned	  in	  some	  ways	  after	  the	  War	  Industries	  Board	  /	  
War	  Finance	  Corporation	  pairing	  and	  War	  Production	  Board	  /	  Reconstruction	  
Finance	  Corporation	  pairing	  of	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  New	  Deal	  eras,	  
and	  in	  other	  ways	  after	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  (FSOC)	  of	  the	  post-­‐
2008/post-­‐GFC	  era.21	  	  	  
	  
Those	  pairings	  and	  conciliar	  arrangements,	  I’ve	  shown,	  simply	  reinstated	  in	  
updated	  form	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Hamilton’s	  Bank	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  
functioned	  both	  as	  a	  money-­‐modulating	  central	  bank	  like	  our	  Fed	  and	  as	  a	  national	  
development	  bank.	  	  
	  
	   So	  how	  does	  my	  contemporary	  –	  and	  now	  permanent	  –	  rendition	  work?	  	  
	  
The	  basic	  idea	  is	  this:	  Our	  Republic	  is	  now	  suffering	  the	  ravages	  of	  pandemic	  
and	  a	  renewed	  worsening	  of	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  divisions	  rooted	  in	  developmental	  
inequity.	  This	  comes	  atop	  the	  newly	  ‘existentialized’	  threat	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  
has	  emerged	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  Whether	  we	  call	  it	  a	  Building	  Back	  Better	  or	  a	  
Green	  New	  Deal,	  then,	  something	  like	  a	  national	  reconstruction	  and	  development	  is	  
going	  to	  be	  necessary.	  	  
	  
The	  sheer	  scale	  of	  the	  needs,	  along	  with	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  distinct	  
industries	  that	  will	  be	  touched,	  will	  in	  turn	  require	  an	  FSOC-­‐like	  coordinating	  council	  
to	  prevent	  mutually	  conflicting	  and	  needlessly	  overlapping	  national	  reconstruction	  
and	  redevelopment	  efforts.	  It	  will	  also	  be	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  adequate	  
collaboration	  not	  only	  across	  executive	  departments,	  but	  also	  public	  and	  private	  
sector	  agents,	  and	  among	  all	  ‘levels’	  of	  government	  in	  our	  federated	  polity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  sources	  last	  cited,	  see	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘U.S.	  Must	  Take	  Equity	  Stakes	  in	  the	  
Companies	  It	  Rescues,’	  Financial	  Times,	  March	  28,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://www.ft.com/content/86a333d0-­‐6dc3-­‐11ea-­‐89df-­‐41bea055720b;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘The	  US	  
Must	  Ramp	  Up	  Production	  by	  the	  World	  Wars	  I	  &	  II	  Playbook,	  Not	  the	  2008	  Playbook,’	  Business	  
Insider,	  March	  29,	  2020,	  available	  at	  https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-­‐pandemic-­‐us-­‐
should-­‐ramp-­‐up-­‐ventilator-­‐mask-­‐manufacturing-­‐2020-­‐3;	  and	  Robert	  Hockett,	  ‘We	  Are	  at	  War	  and	  
Need	  Wartime	  Institutions	  to	  Keep	  Our	  Economy	  Afloat,’	  The	  Hill,	  April	  4,	  2020,	  available	  at	  
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-­‐house/491166-­‐were-­‐at-­‐war-­‐and-­‐need-­‐wartime-­‐institutions-­‐to-­‐
keep-­‐our-­‐economy-­‐producing.	  Also	  Robert	  Hockett,	  White	  Paper:	  How	  to	  Use	  the	  Military	  to	  Produce	  
the	  Supplies	  America	  Needs	  to	  Fight	  the	  Coronavirus,	  New	  Consensus	  (March	  2020);	  Robert	  Hockett,	  
Immediate	  Coronavirus	  Economic	  Mitigation	  Measures,	  New	  Consensus	  White	  Paper	  (March	  2020).	  
	   24	  
	  
	   What	  we	  must	  do,	  then,	  is	  establish	  what	  I	  call	  a	  National	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development	  Council	  (NRDC)	  charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  and	  executing	  (1)	  
a	  comprehensive	  yet	  coherent	  national	  pandemic	  response,	  then	  (2)	  a	  likewise	  
comprehensive	  yet	  coherent	  infrastructural	  reconstruction,	  and	  then	  (3)	  an	  ongoing	  
and	  continually	  updated	  national	  development	  policy	  –	  let’s	  formalize	  it	  as	  an	  ‘NDP’	  
–	  recognized	  to	  be	  every	  bit	  as	  essential	  as	  national	  defense	  policy,	  national	  
economic	  policy,	  national	  environmental	  policy,	  and	  so	  on.	  (Indeed	  the	  first	  is	  
prerequisite	  to	  all	  others.)	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  mission,	  the	  Council	  must	  comprise	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  Fed,	  the	  
Treasury,	  and	  all	  cabinet-­‐level	  and	  other	  relevant	  Executive	  Agencies	  with	  
jurisdiction	  over	  national	  industry	  and	  infrastructure	  –	  e.g.,	  the	  Department	  of	  
Energy,	  the	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  the	  Small	  
Business	  Administration,	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  the	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  
the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	  and	  so	  on.	  These	  persons	  will	  be	  charged	  
with	  formulating	  long-­‐term	  national	  development	  strategies	  within	  each	  of	  their	  
respective	  jurisdictional	  mandates,	  then	  ‘synching	  up’	  and	  synthesizing	  them	  into	  a	  
single	  coherent	  and	  non-­‐duplicative	  whole.	  	  
	  
	   The	  financial	  operations	  of	  NRDC	  can	  be	  managed	  by	  an	  Investment	  
Committee	  that	  I	  have	  proposed	  as	  an	  arm	  of	  the	  NRDC.	  These	  will	  be	  reminiscent	  of	  
those	  of	  Hamilton’s	  Bank,	  the	  WFC,	  and	  the	  RFC	  in	  developing	  means	  by	  which	  
private	  sector	  agents	  can	  participate	  in	  public	  investment,	  thereby	  both	  conferring	  
‘stakes’	  in	  successful	  development	  to	  citizens	  and	  businesses,	  and	  soaking	  up	  private	  
capital	  that	  might	  otherwise	  fuel	  inflation	  by	  flowing	  to	  less	  productive,	  more	  
speculative	  deployments.	  
	  
	   Bring	  these	  together	  with	  the	  ‘Upgraded	  Fed’	  schematized	  above,	  and	  you	  
have	  all	  that	  you	  need	  for	  efficient	  and	  effective	  public	  capital	  management	  both	  in	  
reconstructing	  right	  now	  and	  in	  developing	  –	  or	  rather,	  perpetually	  redeveloping	  –	  
ever	  after.	  	  
	  
The	  NRDC,	  which	  in	  combining	  executive	  agencies	  is	  democratically	  
accountable,	  democratically	  determine	  what	  we	  as	  a	  polity	  deem	  ‘productive,’	  and	  
acts	  to	  coordinate	  –	  in	  an	  information	  aggregating	  and	  facilitative	  sense	  –	  ongoing	  
productive	  development	  across	  our	  full	  continent-­‐spanning	  Republic.	  Meanwhile	  
our	  ‘People’s	  Fed,’	  which	  remember	  is	  part	  of	  our	  NRDC,	  assists	  local	  businesses	  and	  
local	  banks	  nationwide	  at	  the	  more	  ‘micro’	  level,	  acting	  as	  a	  system	  of	  local	  
development	  banks	  per	  the	  original	  vision	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  of	  1913.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  3	  depicts	  the	  upshot.	  It	  is	  meant	  not	  to	  replace	  or	  displace	  Figures	  1	  &	  
2,	  but	  simply	  to	  combine	  and	  flesh	  out	  a	  bit	  more	  detail	  left	  implicit	  in	  both	  of	  them.	  
Here	  we	  see	  (1)	  the	  role	  that	  the	  NRDC	  will	  play	  in	  democratically	  determining	  what	  
counts	  as	  ‘development’	  and	  hence	  what	  is	  ‘productive,’	  (2)	  the	  role	  that	  the	  regional	  
Federal	  Reserve	  Banks	  will	  play	  in	  choosing	  and	  funding	  investments	  thus	  counted	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as	  ‘productive,’	  and	  (3)	  the	  combined	  role	  that	  the	  FRB	  and	  the	  NRDC	  Investment	  
Committee	  and	  any	  fund	  or	  funds	  that	  it	  manages	  will	  play	  in	  assuring	  inter-­‐regional	  
allocative	  balance	  and,	  therefore,	  aggregate	  modulatory	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  
financing	  of	  productive	  development	  projects	  nationwide.	  	  
	  
The	  Price	  Stabilization	  Fund	  (PSF)	  or	  ‘People’s	  Portfolio,’	  more	  on	  which	  in	  a	  
moment,	  for	  its	  part	  can	  be	  either	  an	  NRDC	  fund	  or	  a	  Fed	  fund.	  Either	  way,	  the	  Fed	  
and	  the	  NRDC	  will	  have	  to	  be	  ‘on	  the	  same	  page’	  where	  its	  investments	  are	  
concerned,	  the	  NRDC	  with	  a	  view	  to	  cross-­‐sectoral	  allocative	  needs	  entailed	  by	  
development	  needs,	  and	  the	  Fed	  with	  a	  view	  to	  cross-­‐regional	  allocative	  needs	  in	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10.	  	  Sustainably	  Equitable	  ‘R&D’	  –	  Price	  Stabilization	  &	  Growth	  Sharing	  
	  
A	  final	  word	  on	  price	  stability	  and	  equitable	  growth	  sharing.22	  Yet	  another	  
class	  of	  new	  public	  investment	  instruments	  that	  either	  our	  new	  People’s	  Fed	  or	  our	  
NDRC’s	  IC	  might	  hold	  could	  be	  shares	  in	  a	  new	  Price	  Stabilization	  Fund,	  or	  ‘People’s	  
Portfolio,’	  that	  I	  also	  propose	  in	  other	  work.	  	  
	  
Here	  the	  idea	  is	  to	  recognize	  that	  some	  market	  prices	  and	  indices	  of	  such	  
prices	  are	  what	  I	  call	  ‘systemically	  important,’	  by	  analogy	  to	  the	  Systemically	  
Important	  Financial	  Institutions	  (SIFIs)	  that	  FSOC	  designates.	  These	  are	  prices	  that	  
pervasively	  enter	  either	  directly	  into	  other	  prices	  as	  inputs,	  or	  indirectly	  into	  other	  
prices	  by	  serving	  as	  benchmarks	  or	  reference	  points	  for	  other	  pricing	  decisions	  or	  
derivative	  contracts.	  	  
	  
The	  Fed	  has	  in	  effect	  long	  recognized	  at	  least	  one	  species	  of	  SIPI,	  and	  acted	  in	  
the	  capital	  markets	  to	  ‘collar’	  its	  movements	  within	  one	  narrow	  band	  –	  I	  refer	  to	  
prevailing	  money	  rental,	  or	  ‘interest’	  rates.	  Recent	  years	  have	  seen	  the	  Fed	  widen	  
the	  sphere	  to	  include	  mortgage	  instruments	  and,	  now,	  even	  broad	  portfolios	  of	  
corporate	  instruments	  –	  first	  in	  response	  to	  the	  dramas	  of	  2006-­‐09,	  and	  now	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  Covid	  pandemic.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  all	  but	  inevitable	  that	  the	  Fed,	  along	  with	  a	  new	  NRDC,	  will	  wish	  to	  target	  
more	  such	  prices	  in	  future	  in	  the	  name	  of	  systemic	  financial	  stability.	  That	  will	  be	  
partly	  because	  of	  effective	  credit-­‐modulation’s	  practical	  dependence	  on	  good	  
allocation	  as	  discussed	  above,	  and	  partly	  because	  ‘fine-­‐tuning’	  will	  be	  needed	  as	  the	  
nation	  embarks	  next	  year	  on	  post-­‐Covid	  reconstruction	  and	  then	  either	  a	  Green	  New	  
Deal	  or	  a	  ‘Building	  Back	  Better’	  revitalization	  of	  the	  kind	  also	  discussed	  above.	  	  
	  
In	  time	  the	  most	  efficient	  means	  of	  handling	  this	  growing	  number	  of	  
instruments	  traded	  in	  broadened	  Fed	  open	  market	  operations	  (or	  an	  NRDC	  
equivalent)	  will	  be	  to	  hold	  all	  in	  one	  fund	  or,	  in	  investment-­‐company-­‐speak,	  ‘family	  
of	  funds.’	  This	  fund	  will	  have	  to	  be	  managed	  in	  close	  coordination	  with	  the	  
development	  and	  execution	  of	  NRDC-­‐determined	  national	  development	  policy,	  not	  
to	  mention	  the	  Regional	  Feds’	  gatekeeping	  function	  in	  respect	  of	  private	  sector	  bank	  
lending	  in	  keeping	  with	  evolving	  national	  development	  strategy	  as	  described	  above.	  	  
	  
It	  will	  make	  sense,	  then,	  either	  for	  the	  NRDC’s	  Investment	  Committee	  to	  
manage	  this	  fund	  and	  sell	  the	  Fed	  interests	  in	  it,	  or	  for	  the	  Fed	  itself	  to	  assemble	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  	   This	  Section	  draws	  upon	  Robert	  Hockett,	  The	  People’s	  Portfolio:	  A	  Macroprudential	  Price	  
Stabilization	  Fund,	  64	  CHALLENGE	  __	  (2020)	  (forthcoming);	  Robert	  Hockett,	  Open	  Labor	  Market	  
Operations,	  62	  CHALLENGE	  113	  (2019),	  available	  at	  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05775132.2019.1583418;	  Robert	  Hockett,	  How	  to	  
Make	  QE	  More	  Helpful—By	  Fed	  Shorting	  of	  Commodities,	  BENZINGA	  (Oct.	  14,	  2011,	  8:41	  PM),	  
https://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988109/how-­‐to-­‐make-­‐qe-­‐more-­‐helpful-­‐by-­‐fed-­‐shorting-­‐
of-­‐commodities;	  HOCKETT,	  FINANCING	  THE	  GREEN	  NEW	  DEAL,	  op.	  cit.;	  and	  Hockett,	  Treasury	  Growth	  
Dividends,	  op.	  cit.	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manage	  the	  Fund.	  Hence	  my	  inclusion	  of	  this	  Fund	  in	  Figure	  3	  above.	  Either	  way,	  
this	  will	  afford	  another	  set	  of	  assets	  for	  the	  newly	  enlarged	  public	  asset	  portfolio	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  newly	  enlarged	  liability	  side	  of	  the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet	  brought	  
by	  Citizen,	  Business,	  and	  Guest	  Wallets.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  we	  can	  imagine	  one	  additional	  source	  of	  enlargement	  of	  both	  the	  
asset	  and	  liability	  sides	  of	  the	  new	  People’s	  Fed	  balance	  sheet:	  If	  national	  
redevelopment	  succeeds	  as	  investment	  becomes	  productive	  rather	  than	  merely	  
speculative	  again,	  national	  wealth	  will	  be	  growing.	  So,	  then,	  will	  the	  Fed’s	  asset	  
portfolio,	  as	  investment	  returns	  flow	  in.	  
	  
Why	  not	  share	  these	  with	  citizens,	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  growth-­‐indexed	  UBI	  –	  at	  
least	  insofar	  as	  this	  can	  be	  kept	  consistent	  with	  consumer	  price	  stability.	  We	  can	  
think	  of	  these	  as	  ‘Returns	  on	  Public	  Investment’	  (ROPI)	  wrought	  by	  public	  capital	  	  
management	  alongside	  the	  more	  familiar	  ‘Returns	  on	  Investment’	  (ROI)	  associated	  
with	  private	  capital	  management.	  	  
	  
In	  other	  work	  cited	  above,	  I	  have	  proposed	  these	  as	  ‘Treasury	  Growth	  
Dividends,’	  so-­‐named	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  association	  with	  my	  proposed	  Digital	  
Greenback	  and	  Treasury	  Dollar.	  If	  we	  go	  the	  full	  Fed/NRDC	  route	  prescribed	  here,	  
however,	  those	  will	  be	  best	  handled	  as	  I’ve	  just	  described	  –	  by	  our	  revitalized	  
People’s	  Fed	  and	  NRDC	  –	  and	  be	  called	  ‘Citizen-­‐’	  or	  ‘Commonwealth	  Growth	  
Dividends.’	  	  
	  
Once	  again	  either	  way,	  the	  mutual	  enlargement	  of	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Fed	  
balance	  sheet	  seems	  fitting	  –	  indeed	  fully	  vindicating	  of	  the	  very	  point	  of	  this	  brief	  
précis.	  For	  this	  has	  been	  all	  about	  reclaiming	  public	  capital	  for	  publicly	  cognizably	  
productive	  investment	  –	  investment	  that	  grows	  the	  Republic’s	  wealth.	  And	  the	  
Republic’s	  wealth	  just	  is	  the	  Citizens’	  wealth	  –	  	  our	  ‘Commonwealth.’	  This	  is,	  of	  
course,	  what	  we	  owe	  and	  are	  owed	  by	  one	  another.23	  	  	  
	  
It’s	  literally	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  ourselves.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  –	  Building	  Back	  Better	  and	  Beyond	  
	  
And	  that’s	  that.	  We	  have	  found	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  
investment	  capital,	  seen	  why	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  must	  manage	  their	  own	  
shares	  of	  the	  aggregate,	  and	  designed	  a	  full	  architecture	  to	  enable	  that	  –	  an	  
architecture	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  present	  arrangements,	  and	  
changes	  them	  neither	  a	  whit	  more	  nor	  a	  whit	  less	  than	  what’s	  requisite	  to	  achieving	  
that	  task.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  	   See	  ROBERT	  HOCKETT,	  A	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  OWNERS	  (Yale	  U.	  Press	  2021)	  (forthcoming);	  and	  HOCKETT,	  
ROUSSEAUVIAN	  MONEY,	  op.	  cit.	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The	  next	  steps,	  of	  course,	  are	  to	  promulgate	  new	  rules	  under	  old	  laws	  and	  get	  
moving.	  And	  here,	  I	  must	  say,	  prospects	  have	  not	  in	  our	  lifetimes	  looked	  as	  
promising	  as	  they	  do	  now…	  	  
	  
Virtually	  everyone	  seems	  to	  agree	  that	  something’s	  gone	  terribly	  wrong	  with	  
our	  present	  financial	  arrangements	  –	  arrangements	  that	  sever	  public	  capital	  from	  
publically	  cognizably	  productive	  investment.	  All	  appear	  likewise	  to	  agree	  that	  a	  
national	  reconstruction,	  followed	  by	  serious	  national	  redevelopment,	  is	  now	  
imperative.	  And	  now	  both	  the	  ideas	  of	  and	  the	  means	  to	  enabling	  public	  options	  for	  
banking	  and	  even	  central	  bank-­‐issued	  digital	  currencies	  are	  gaining	  traction	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
Add	  in	  enthusiasm	  for	  a	  Building	  Back	  Better	  or	  Green	  New	  Deal,	  and	  it	  
grows	  difficult	  not	  to	  grow	  giddy	  at	  this	  ‘perfect	  storm’	  of	  readiness	  to	  do	  all	  that	  
needs	  doing	  on	  both	  the	  asset	  and	  liability	  sides	  of	  our	  public	  ledger.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   These	  things	  are	  all	  sure	  to	  happen	  if	  darker	  –	  or	  hotter	  –	  forces	  don’t	  tear	  
down	  or	  burn	  up	  our	  Republic	  before	  we’ve	  arrived.	  For	  the	  logic	  that	  forces	  them	  
on	  us	  is	  hard	  not	  to	  see	  once	  it’s	  been	  pointed	  out,	  especially	  as	  the	  dysfunctions	  
that	  this	  logic	  shows	  to	  inevitable	  until	  we	  do	  it	  continue	  to	  gather	  all	  round	  us.	  	  
	  
But	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  waiting	  for	  these	  things	  to	  happen.	  The	  thing	  to	  do	  
now	  is	  to	  do	  it,	  and	  do	  it	  now.	  Ours	  is	  a	  Capital	  Commons	  whether	  we	  see	  it	  and	  use	  
it	  or	  not.	  It	  is,	  as	  the	  financiers	  say,	  money	  on	  the	  table’	  –	  in	  this	  case	  public	  money	  
on	  the	  table.	  	  
	  




Summary	  Appendix:	  12	  Steps	  to	  the	  Capital	  Commons	  
	  
We	  can	  sum	  up	  the	  foregoing	  in	  twelve	  paragraphs.	  We	  might	  think	  of	  these	  as	  a	  sequenced	  	  
‘12-­‐step	  program’	  for	  the	  reform	  first	  of	  understanding	  and	  then	  of	  action	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  both	  (a)	  
ending	  our	  dysfunctional	  dependence	  on	  private	  management	  of	  our	  public	  capital,	  and	  
symmetrically	  (b)	  re-­‐assuming	  responsibility	  for	  the	  productive	  management	  of	  that	  capital.	  The	  
thing	  to	  do,	  then,	  is	  to	  understand	  that	  …	  	  	  
	  
1)	   Most	  investment	  capital	  in	  ‘developed’	  nations	  is	  public	  capital,	  which	  is	  not	  pre-­‐
accumulated	  and	  'intermediated'	  like	  private	  capital,	  but	  publicly	  generated	  and	  indefinitely	  
extensible	  as	  'endogenous	  credit-­‐money.'	  Publicly	  licensed	  banks	  and	  bank-­‐equivalents	  (‘shadow	  
banks’)	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  generating	  this	  form	  of	  monetized	  capital.	  Hence	  Wicksell's	  'bank	  money'	  
and	  ‘loanable	  funds,’	  which	  some	  self-­‐styled	  heterodox	  and	  orthodox	  economists	  routinely	  
mischaracterize	  as	  exogenously	  given	  private,	  not	  endogenously	  generated	  public,	  capital.	  	  
	  
2)	   Private	  management	  of	  public	  capital	  inevitably	  results	  in	  misallocation	  (under-­‐investment),	  
ineffective	  modulation	  (over-­‐speculation),	  and	  secular	  stagnation	  (under-­‐production).	  That	  is	  thanks	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to	  (a)	  the	  monetization	  of	  capital	  in	  all	  non-­‐barter	  exchange	  economies,	  combined	  with	  (b)	  recursive	  
collective	  action	  predicaments	  that	  pervade	  all	  ‘privately	  ordered,’	  decentralized	  capital	  &	  money	  
markets.	  The	  first	  separates	  profit	  and	  production;	  the	  second	  ensures	  that	  private	  sector	  capital	  and	  
money	  managers	  opt	  for	  the	  former,	  not	  for	  the	  latter.	  	  
	  
3)	   Both	  (2)(a)	  and	  (2)(b)	  above	  also	  drive	  ‘financialization’	  in	  privately	  ordered	  markets	  for	  
public	  capital	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  recursive	  stratification	  of	  capital	  markets	  into	  ‘secondary,’	  ‘tertiary,	  …	  ‘n-­‐
ary’	  and	  derivative	  markets.	  These	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  ‘Meta-­‐Markets’	  and	  ‘Dialectic	  of	  Finance’	  
work.	  The	  process	  begins	  innocently	  as	  individually	  rational	  private	  sector	  attempts	  to	  re-­‐socialize	  
private	  investment-­‐risk	  attendant	  on	  decentralized	  privately	  ordered	  production,	  but	  these	  quickly	  
morph	  into	  collectively	  irrational	  sites	  at	  which	  capital	  managers	  find	  greater	  profit	  in	  gambling	  on	  
price	  movements	  in	  ‘capital	  markets’	  than	  in	  investing	  in	  productive	  capital	  projects.	  Financialization	  
is	  in	  this	  sense	  ‘the	  mother	  of’	  –	  or,	  better,	  the	  aggregation	  of	  –	  all	  recursive	  collective	  action	  
predicaments	  in	  privately	  ordered	  markets	  in	  which	  public	  capital	  is	  privately	  traded.	  	  	  
	  
4)	   Groups	  solve	  collective	  action	  predicaments	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  collective	  agency	  –	  that	  
is,	  through	  collective	  governance	  or	  public	  action.	  Publicly	  generated	  capital	  must	  accordingly,	  in	  
light	  of	  both	  (2)	  and	  (3),	  be	  publicly	  managed,	  while	  privately	  intermediated	  capital	  may	  be	  privately	  
managed.	  Privately	  ordered,	  decentralized	  ‘capitalist’	  production	  is	  sustainable	  only	  if	  the	  public	  
component	  of	  the	  nation’s	  capital	  stock	  is	  not	  privately	  ordered	  or	  decentralized.	  Narrow	  banking	  
proposals	  like	  Fisher’s	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  its	  contemporary	  retreads	  reflect	  understanding	  of	  one	  side	  
of	  this	  two-­‐sided	  ‘coin’	  but	  not	  the	  other	  –	  they	  ‘get’	  the	  ‘shalt	  not’	  of	  privately	  managed	  public	  
capital,	  but	  are	  silent	  on	  the	  ‘thou	  shalt’	  of	  publicly	  managed	  public	  capital.	  	  
	  
5)	   Public	  capital	  management	  can	  be	  and	  is	  best	  modeled	  as	  a	  central	  bank	  balance	  sheet.	  In	  the	  
U.S.,	  that	  is	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  (‘Fed’)	  Balance	  Sheet.	  Public	  reclamation	  of	  responsibility	  for	  
managing	  the	  public	  share	  of	  the	  nation’s	  capital	  stock	  will	  accordingly	  register	  as	  an	  augmentation	  
of	  the	  Fed	  balance	  sheet,	  growing	  its	  asset	  and	  liability	  ‘sides’	  in	  tandem.	  We	  can	  call	  the	  resultant	  
augmented	  or	  ‘upgraded’	  Fed	  ‘a	  Peoples’	  Fed,’	  or	  ‘Citizens’	  Fed,’	  tasked	  with	  publicly	  managing	  our	  
Republic’s	  investment	  capital	  –	  the	  wealth	  of	  our	  Commonwealth.	  
	  
6)	   On	  the	  Public	  Asset	  ‘side’	  of	  the	  Fed	  Balance	  Sheet,	  the	  most	  straightforward	  and	  non-­‐
‘disruptive’	  corrective	  measure	  will	  be	  to	  reinstate	  the	  Fed’s	  original	  role	  as	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  public	  
capital	  manager	  comprising	  both	  (a)	  at	  the	  ‘macro’	  level,	  a	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  tasked	  with	  
modulating	  monetized	  credit	  aggregates	  economy-­‐wide,	  and	  (b)	  at	  the	  ‘micro’	  level,	  Regional	  Federal	  
Reserve	  Banks	  tasked	  with	  allocating	  public	  investment	  capital	  only	  productively,	  not	  speculatively,	  
as	  befits	  that	  network	  of	  regional	  development	  banks	  which	  the	  Fed	  System’s	  second	  tier	  was	  
originally	  intended	  to	  be.	  	  
	  
7)	   Productive	  Regional	  Fed	  lending	  will	  thus	  once	  again	  take	  both	  of	  the	  forms	  it	  originally	  took	  
–	  (a)	  direct	  purchase	  of	  productive	  project-­‐associated	  paper	  issued	  by	  local	  and	  regional	  ‘operating	  
companies’	  (that	  is,	  producers	  and	  service-­‐providers),	  and	  (b)	  indirect	  lending	  to	  operating	  
companies	  through	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  community	  banks	  that	  fund	  lending	  not	  with	  deposits,	  
but	  through	  Fed	  Discount	  Window	  lending,	  which	  latter	  will	  be	  conditioned	  ex	  ante	  on	  projects’	  
promising	  to	  be	  productive,	  not	  speculative.	  I	  call	  this	  ‘Re-­‐Distributing,’	  as	  in	  again	  distributing	  the	  
project	  lending	  of	  the	  Fed	  over	  the	  full	  breadth	  of	  our	  continent-­‐spanning	  Repubic.	  Our	  mantra	  
should	  be	  to	  ‘Spread	  the	  Fed.’	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8)	   On	  the	  Public	  Liability	  side	  of	  the	  newly	  augmented	  or	  upgraded	  Fed	  Balance	  Sheet,	  the	  most	  
straightforward	  and	  non-­‐‘disruptive’	  corrective	  measure	  will	  be	  to	  extend	  to	  all	  citizens,	  businesses,	  
and	  legal	  residents	  of	  the	  nation	  interest-­‐bearing	  P2P	  digital	  wallets,	  the	  balances	  in	  which	  will	  be	  
new	  Fed	  liabilities	  corresponding	  to	  the	  new	  Fed	  assets	  described	  in	  (7).	  This	  is	  my	  'Democratic	  
Digital	  Dollar'	  and	  associated	  'Fed	  Wallets'	  proposal,	  which	  should	  be	  considered	  (a)	  the	  ‘end-­‐game’	  
of	  my	  more	  immediately	  implementable	  ‘Treasury	  Dollar’	  and	  ‘Digital	  Greenbacks’	  proposals	  now	  
before	  Congress,	  and	  (b)	  the	  national	  rendition	  of	  my	  state	  and	  municipal	  ‘Inclusive	  Value	  Ledger’	  
(IVL)	  proposal	  now	  before	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Assembly	  and	  Senate.	  	  
	  
9)	   Inasmuch	  as	  Federal	  Reserve	  Notes	  (paper	  dollars)	  and	  their	  fiduciary	  equivalent	  
(Wicksellian	  bank	  money)	  are	  themselves	  Fed	  liabilities	  –	  indeed,	  our	  presently	  dominant	  form	  of	  
monetized	  public	  capital	  instrument	  –	  the	  Democratic	  Digital	  Dollar	  will	  amount	  simply	  to	  (a)	  a	  
digitization	  of	  already-­‐existent	  Fed	  liabilities,	  and	  (b)	  a	  movement	  of	  the	  ‘bank	  money’	  component	  
thereof	  from	  private	  sector	  bank	  balance	  sheets	  to	  the	  Fed	  Balance	  Sheet.	  This	  will	  in	  turn	  make	  for	  
far	  better	  banking	  than	  we	  presently	  enjoy.	  
	  
10)	   It	  will	  make	  for	  better	  banking	  in	  multiple	  ways:	  (a)	  There	  will	  be	  no	  more	  commercial	  or	  
financial	  exclusion	  (‘unbanked’	  or	  ‘underbanked’	  status)	  plaguing	  our	  citizenry	  or	  small	  businesses,	  
nor	  will	  there	  be	  privately	  assessed	  rents	  known	  euphemistically	  as	  ‘fees.’	  (b)	  There	  will	  be	  no	  more	  
shortages	  of	  circulating	  payment	  media	  in	  isolated	  communities,	  and	  transaction	  speeds,	  hence	  
growth,	  will	  accelerate.	  (c)	  Monetary	  policy	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  subject	  to	  leakage	  owing	  to	  reliance	  on	  
private	  sector	  financial	  institutions	  that	  ‘intermediate’	  –	  that	  is,	  interfere	  with	  relations	  –	  between	  
the	  Citizenry	  and	  its	  Central	  Bank;	  the	  Fed	  will	  modulate	  the	  national	  credit-­‐money	  supply	  by	  raising	  
and	  lowering	  interest	  paid	  out	  on	  wallets,	  not	  merely	  private	  sector	  bank	  interest	  on	  reserves	  (IOR),	  
and	  in	  extremis	  can	  even	  drop	  digital	  ‘helicopter	  money’	  into	  citizens’	  wallets.	  (d)	  Public	  authorities	  
will	  be	  able	  to	  compensate	  currently	  uncompensated	  ‘care	  work’	  upon	  digital	  ‘proof	  of	  work	  (POW).	  
(e)	  Finally,	  the	  3D	  being	  a	  public	  commercial	  utility	  (as	  FedWire	  and	  FedNow	  are	  now),	  profits	  are	  
removed	  from	  the	  picture	  while	  4th	  Amendment	  protections	  are	  added	  –	  there	  will	  be	  no	  more	  
breaches	  of	  commercial	  privacy	  or	  'harvesting'	  of	  consumer	  financial	  data.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
11)	   We	  can	  complete	  the	  Productive	  Public	  Capital	  (PPC)	  picture	  with	  an	  organizational	  tweak	  to	  
our	  existing	  system	  of	  cabinet-­‐level	  executive	  agencies	  that	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  nation’s	  
infrastructure	  and	  industry:	  My	  proposed	  'National	  Reconstruction	  &	  Development	  Council'	  (NRDC)	  -­‐	  
an	  'FSOC	  for	  Development'	  comprising	  the	  heads	  of	  all	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  cabinet	  level	  executive	  
agencies	  –	  will	  develop,	  regularly	  update,	  and	  execute	  a	  National	  Development	  Policy	  (NDP),	  which	  
both	  (a)	  affords	  guidance	  as	  to	  what	  we	  democratically	  deem	  'productive'	  for	  purposes	  of	  Fed	  
lending,	  and	  (b)	  coordinates	  with	  the	  Fed	  in	  assuring	  that	  productive	  lending	  and	  national	  
development	  occur	  evenly	  and	  equitably	  throughout	  our	  continent-­‐spanning	  Republic	  in	  manners	  
neither	  inflationary	  nor	  deflationary.	  
	  
12)	   Finally,	  we	  can	  round	  out	  the	  public	  capital	  management	  upgrade	  with	  equitable	  growth	  
sharing	  and	  macroprudential	  price	  stabilization	  -­‐	  my	  'Growth	  Dividends'	  proposal	  for	  regular	  UBI	  
deposits	  into	  the	  Fed	  Wallets	  as	  national	  wealth	  grows	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  and	  a	  Price	  Stabilization	  
Fund	  (PSF),	  a.k.a.	  'People's	  Portfolio'	  for	  open	  market	  operations	  to	  collar	  what	  I	  call	  Systemically	  
Important	  Prices	  and	  Indices	  (SIPIs)	  –	  housing	  prices,	  fuel	  prices,	  Libor,	  some	  additional	  staple	  and	  
commodity	  prices,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  SSP	  or	  prevailing	  wage	  rates	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  wage	  scale.	  
These	  are	  of	  course	  add-­‐ons	  to	  the	  core	  upgrade	  elaborated	  above,	  hence	  can	  be	  postponed	  or	  
severed	  if	  not	  already	  broadly	  supported	  by	  the	  citizenry.	  
